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ABSTRACT
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT:
AN EXPLORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY
AND VIOLENT CONFLICT
By
MECCA SAMARIA MUHAMMAD
DECEMBER 2020
Committee Chair: Dr. Volkan Topalli
Major Department: Criminal Justice and Criminology
In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between horizontal inequality and violent
conflict dynamics. Mass violent conflict is a debilitating social issue associated with economic
deprivation, health crises, and loss of life. Scholars across various disciplines have studied its
determinants. Several authors suggest the importance of horizontal inequality, or relative
inequality between groups, for determining the likelihood of violent conflict. However, data
limitations have prevented researchers from confidently asserting the generalizability or certainty
of horizontal inequality’s potential effect on conflict. It is also possible that horizontal inequality
could have an effect on the dynamics of a conflict, such as which groups become involved in
conflict. However, few researchers have examined horizontal inequality’s relationship with other
conflict dynamics. I fill some of these gaps by using census data to examine the relationship
between horizontal inequality and 1) violent conflict occurrence, and 2) group involvement in
conflict. I calculate six measures of social and economic horizontal inequality for each relevant
cultural group in eight countries using census data ranging from 1971-2011, and I combine these
data with existing data on political horizontal inequality. I then analyze how indicators of
horizontal inequality relate to the likelihood of conflict in a given year, and the likelihood of a
given group engaging in conflict. Results support the hypothesis that horizontal inequality

correlates with conflict dynamics; however, the specific way in which a society is unequal
affects whether conflict occurrence or group involvement are more or less likely. Just as relative
inequality seems to affect conflict differently than absolute inequality, the specific factors that
are unequal appear to have differential effects on conflict occurrence and group involvement.
Results also suggest that horizontal inequality does not just affect conflict, but also conflict
dynamics. It seems the relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics could be
more complex than previously thought. Further attention should be dedicated to pursuing
additional data and studying this topic. Policy implications include that reducing social, political,
and economic inequality between groups might help mitigate violent conflict, and that
ameliorating the most pernicious forms of inequality might have the most significant effect.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The formal study of mass violent conflict emerged in the 1960s (Galtung et al. 2013) with
important works such as those of Galtung (1964), who is known for pioneering peace and
conflict studies and examining sustainable peace. Even before then, however, scholars and
practitioners have expressed strong interest in understanding and preventing the advent of interand intra-national violent conflict. Works ranging from those of Thomas Hobbes (1651) to
Immanuel Kant (1795) explore why conflict develops when and how it does. For years, scholars
have undertaken this question with the rationale that, if we better understand violent conflict, we
will be better equipped to predict and prevent it.
Scholars have examined a variety of conflicts such as interstate war, civil war, etc., but,
for the purposes of this work, I employ the term conflict to refer to non-traditional mass civil
violent contested incompatibilities between a state and non-state actor, where both parties are
armed groups, and where the conflict takes place within a country. These intrastate struggles
require at least twenty-five annual battle-related deaths to qualify as a violent conflict, as is
consistent with the extant literature and databases on conflict (e.g., Gleditsch 2002; Stewart
2002; Braithwaite et al. 2010a; Kreutz 2010).
The discussion of violent conflict has spanned several centuries and received attention
from several disciplines. Criminologists, political scientists, and scholars from various other
fields have a vested interest in preventing violence, preserving stability, and promoting security.
In criminology and sociology, for example, some scholars have suggested there is a duty to
address macro-level violent conflict across countries, as its violent nature and association with
high rates of victimization make it both a relevant and urgent topic of study (Schoenfeld et al.
2009; Moon 2011). Criminologists who study conflict argue they have a unique skillset allowing
1

them to make sense of why violence happens in these cases and can offer suggestions on how to
best prevent it. They contend that, despite the fact that political scientists are often seen as
leading the discussion on macro-level conflict, criminologists should take a more prominent role
in its study, prevention, and mitigation. This, they assert, is because of criminologists’ focus on
studying both the perpetrators and victims of violence as well as the underlying conditions that
bring them together.
Researchers’ explorations of conflict, peace, and their determinants have led to several
notable developments. Specifically, researchers have articulated novel concepts that might help
better explain conflict, and they have taken advantage of newly-developed data and
methodologies to test the applicability of these concepts. One recently developed concept is
horizontal inequality, which occurs when there are social, political, or economic disparities
between two or more collective groups (i.e., groups that each have a shared identity) (Stewart
2000). Horizontal inequality is the relative inequality between groups, as opposed to vertical
inequality, which is a society’s absolute, or total, inequality (Stewart 2000). The literature on
horizontal inequality and violent conflict is lacking. Still, existing studies suggest that horizontal
inequality might be a key influencer in conflict (Stewart 2002; Ostby 2008; Mancini 2008;
Cederman et al. 2013).
New research methods are also emerging in the field. Historically, persistent data
limitations have forced researchers to impute missing data, or employ case studies where there is
a dearth of macro-level data. While these studies have been immensely contributive to the field’s
theoretical developments, the potentially biased nature of the data also limits their ability to
identify causal relationships or claim generalizable correlations. For reasons discussed in Chapter
2, these data and methods have not fully addressed the question of whether, and how, horizontal

2

inequality affects violent conflict. Consequently, scholars are exploring the mechanisms through
which better data and methods can be implemented to further the understanding of conflict.
Researchers across various fields have contributed to the above developments, with their
commonality being their mutual interest in the etiologies and prevention of violence and
victimization. Each of these fields have contributed to the study of inequality and conflict.
Because of this mutual interest (and potentially, the mutual good that can come from the such
research), it is worthwhile to look past disciplinary boundaries and begin exploring what scholars
from a range of areas offer on the relationship between inequality and conflict 1. It is the interest
in better understanding and ameliorating inequality, instability, and violence that has led many
researchers (myself included) to take up their area of study. It is therefore useful to recognize and
take into consideration the works of these scholars, who emerge from many academic
backgrounds. Doing so helps provide a fuller understanding of inequality and conflict, and also
makes it more possible to address gaps in the literature and further the knowledge-base on the
topic.
Today, our understanding of the relationship between inequality and conflict is not fully
developed. We still do not fully understand how horizontal inequality, or other relevant potential
influencers (e.g., collective framing, governmental repression, etc.), relate to violent conflict or
its dynamics. For the most part this is because we have historically had limited capabilities 2 to
assess how well variables of interest predict conflict, and even further limited data with which to

To this end, a fuller discussion of the various disciplines’ most relevant contributions to this paper can be found in
Chapter 2, “Literature Review.” A discussion of potential steps towards interdisciplinary collaboration in this area of
study can be found in section 6.2, “Conclusions.”
2 Many studies of conflict determinants, which often include simple correlational analyses, have performed poorly
when actually predicting conflict (Ward et al. 2010). In these cases, statistically significant independent variables
have not translated into a better ability to understand and predict when and where civil conflict occurs (Ward et al.
2010). However, some complex statistical models that have performed better at predicting conflict suffer from a
“black box” phenomenon, in which it is difficult to disentangle the effect of any given independent variable
(Cederman and Weidmann 2017). This again limits researchers’ ability to understand what causes conflict and why.
1
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try. The literature on horizontal inequality and conflict is relatively new, as the study of
horizontal inequality was only first applied to conflict by Stewart (2000). Because of this, there
are still a host of research questions surrounding its relationship to conflict and conflict
dynamics.
There are several gaps in the literature on conflict and peace. To maintain a digestible
scope and help ensure analytical integrity, I address only a narrow range of them. The goal is not
to draw a definitive overall conclusion on why, how, or when conflict develops, but rather, to
better identify the role horizontal inequality plays in shaping conflicts between groups within
national societies. To this end, I specifically focus on illuminating how variations of horizontal
inequality (social, economic, and political) correlate with 1) conflict occurrence and 2) group
involvement in conflict. In the current work, I use census data from various countries to assess
whether these variables seem to be correlated with violent conflict and which groups engage in
that conflict.
The first gap I address is the absence of a cross-country analysis on horizontal inequality
and conflict that solely uses existing data. Cross-country data on horizontal inequality has
consistently had gaps, particularly in countries where grouped differences have been associated
with violent conflict (Canelas and Gisselquist 2018). This is because 1) data collection is not
standardized across countries, leading to different available variables of study, 2) data explicitly
documenting intergroup inequalities is often censored in countries where such differences have
led to violence and instability, and 3) measuring and studying the effect of horizontal inequality
on conflict is relatively new, largely coming to practice in the early 2000s with the work of
Frances Stewart (2000). As such, several studies on horizontal inequality rely on data that was
not actually observed, but was inferred via back projection, imputation, or other methods (e.g.,
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Ostby 2008; EPDC 2015). While these studies have been highly contributive to the field, the
assumptions researchers have had to make about how inequality trends over time to generate the
previously missing data have been questionable. If these assumptions are not empirically
supported, their findings could be inaccurate. Therefore, research that does not rely on such
assumptions would be a useful addition to the discourse. The findings would provide insight as
to how horizontal inequality and violent conflict relate to each other, as it would rely on data that
is more reflective of what has been observed in practice. I therefore solely used existing data in
this study.
My second contribution is to incorporate a previously unstudied dependent variable:
group involvement in conflict. Previous studies of horizontal inequality and conflict have largely
focused on whether conflict occurs (e.g., Mancini 2008; Tiwari 2010; Cederman et al. 2011).
Because of the limitations of prior studies and available data, this examination is still a
worthwhile venture, particularly with additional data. However, it is also possible that horizontal
inequality is implicated in the dynamics of violent conflict, such as which groups become
involved in the conflict. To explore this possibility, I examine whether conflict occurs and
identify those groups that are involved in the conflict. In doing so, I hope to provide insight that
will help researchers better identify paths for further examination in the study of horizontal
inequality and conflict dynamics. The ultimate goal is that such works will eventually help us
better understand and prevent the development of intranational conflict.
As a third innovation, I implement measures of economic and social inequality that differ
from those others have employed in many previous studies. The most prominent source of
information on horizontal inequality is demographic data gathered by national governments or
intergovernmental organizations. However, because these data were not collected for the purpose
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of measuring horizontal inequality and are not standardized, they are not optimal for the study of
the relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict. Relatedly, likely because it is a
relatively new concept with limited available data, original exploratory analyses only featured
simple measures of horizontal inequality. In these cases, a single indicator was employed to
comprehensively represent social or economic horizontal inequality (ex., Ostby 2008). In these
ways, researchers have traditionally used limited measures of horizontal inequality.
Subsequently, the estimated effects of horizontal inequality could therefore be less accurate
(Chesher 1991). Simpler measures of horizontal inequality do not capture the breadth of what
inequality between groups looks like on the ground, and their use could lead to inaccurate
estimations of the effect of horizontal inequality on conflict (Kreutz 2010). In response to this
gap, I incorporated measures of horizontal inequality that include indicators (e.g., child mortality
rates, unemployment rates, etc.) that have yet to be featured in previous cross-country analyses,
to my knowledge. While incorporating such measures will not completely rectify the problem of
having a limited capture of what inequality looks like on the ground, it should provide a fuller
picture and facilitate a better understanding of the value horizontal inequality has for explaining
variations in conflict and its dynamics.
The fourth gap I address is the lack of a quantitative cross-country analysis of social,
economic, and political horizontal inequality. Perhaps surprisingly, explicitly measuring and
studying the effect of horizontal inequality – as opposed to general (or vertical) inequality – on
conflict is relatively new. As such, there is a lack of diverse studies on horizontal inequality and
violent conflict. After searching the literature, I have found none that feature measures of
political, social, and economic horizontal inequality together in a single cross-country analysis.
This limits the ability of scholars to examine general effects, differences in these effects, and
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independence of these effects. It also limits their ability to determine which forms of inequality
account for the most variance in conflict developments.
Although many other gaps exist within the conflict and peace literature, I focus here on
addressing the above four. To do so, I employed census data to calculate broader measures of
horizontal inequality and assess how they seem to correlate with conflict occurrence and group
involvement in conflict. I engaged this strategy to better understand 1) how more comprehensive
measures of horizontal inequality relate to conflict, given existing data, and 2) how horizontal
inequality relates to group involvement.
To this end, I address two focal research questions:
1) What is the extent to which social, economic, and political horizontal inequality correlate
with violent conflict occurrence?
2) What is the extent to which social, economic, and political horizontal inequality correlate
with group involvement in violent conflict?
As the study of conflict and inequality develops, policymakers and researchers have
provided evidence of research on peace and conflict leading to subsequent advances in practical
conflict prevention (Ackermann 2003; Braithwaite et al. 2010b). In this dissertation, I seek to
contribute to that body of evidence by informing how we understand the impact of horizontal
inequality on conflict occurrence and involvement. It is my hope that this research will help us
better understand how horizontal inequality relates to violent conflict and its dynamics, with
implications for how we might better address them.

7

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 An Introduction to the Literature
For centuries, scholars have been exploring what causes peace and conflict, in the hopes
that they can eventually learn to prevent conflict and encourage peace (Ackermann 2003). This
years-long pursuit has produced a number of seminal works on the topic (e.g., Kant 1795;
Galtung 1964a) and spanned across disciplines including criminology, political science, and
psychology.
Studying peace and conflict is in the interest of scholars from all of these disciplines, as
its causes and effects overlap with theories and research areas across all of them. Political
scientists are concerned with the political stability and power dynamics of a society.
Psychologists have interests in both how people rationalize violence and how violence affects
their psychological well-being. Criminologists are interested in violence and security, both at the
macro- and micro-level. They frequently study why a given act of violence occurs, and how
stable, secure societies can be equitably encouraged and maintained. The study of peace and
conflict, therefore, bears relevance for and features scholars from each of these (and other
related) fields 3. However, despite the interdisciplinary nature and prominence of peace and
conflict studies, researchers are still debating their determinants in siloed fashion. Consequently,
there remains much about this topic that we do not fully understand.
A considerable portion of the research on conflict has focused on identifying factors that
contribute to it. In recent years, concepts like horizontal inequality and collective framing4 have

3

It simultaneously should be given more attention from researchers in some of these fields, such as criminology,
where, despite some attention, many scholars primarily focus on micro-level acts of violence that occur in localized
spaces.
4 Collective framing is the process by which a collective group makes sense of a given situation. See Chapter 2.3.1,
“Collective Framing,” for a fuller discussion.

8

emerged and gained traction in the literature as potential explanations (Stewart 2000; Cramer
2003; Ostby 2008; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Cederman et al. 2011). Ideas like these
have shown some promise in these studies, but conclusions researchers can definitively draw
from them are still constrained. This is due to limitations that have historically restricted
researchers’ analytical approaches.
Before grappling with issues as complex as “why and how conflict happens” and “why
and how peace happens,” it is helpful to review the literature on such topics. Upon delving into
these works, it is important to recognize that these two questions are different, despite feeding
into and relating to each other. While some factors might seem to instigate conflict (in which
case, addressing them might help prevent it), others might contribute to peace after conflict has
already begun. Researchers examining these questions, therefore, have branched out into
different directions and created a body of literature on why different kinds of conflict initially
start, and why different kinds of peace5 take hold when and where they do.
I cannot cover all of these contributions. Therefore, for the purposes of this discussion, I
will start at the beginning of the issue, where prevention might be most promising. I focus here
on studies that ask why violent conflict develops, as well as when, where, and how it does. I
specifically focus on studies that examine the factors I ultimately hypothesize are most
explanatory of conflict.
In this dissertation, I focus on the relationship between horizontal inequality and
intrastate mass violent conflict. Conflict is defined as an armed incompatibility between a state
and non-state actor resulting in at least twenty-five annual battle-related deaths (Petterson et al.

5

Peace can be conceptualized in several ways (see Galtung 1964 for a fuller discussion), including the absence of
violence (often termed “negative peace”) or the presence of cooperation between formerly opposing groups
(“positive peace”). Which peace is the topic of study is left to the individual researcher.

9

2019; Gleditsch et al. 2002). This is the definition most commonly used in the existing literature
and databases on intrastate conflict (e.g., Gleditsch 2002; Stewart 2002; Braithwaite et al. 2010a;
Kreutz 2010; Petterson et al. 2019). I also remain consistent with the existing literature in my
examination of intrastate, rather than interstate, conflicts, since my analysis accounts for the
relationship between inequality between groups and violent conflict within a society. Conflict
researchers have suggested that inequality between groups within a given society is likely to
affect whether there is violence between those groups in that society (Stewart 2000; Stewart
2008; Willems 2012; Cederman et al. 2013). Therefore, intrastate conflict is the conflict of focus.

2.2 Inequality: The Ultimate “It Depends”
Debates on what causes conflict have focused on the importance of factors such as inequality
(Stewart 2008), opportunity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), anomie (Braithwaite et al. 2010), and
framing (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). A particularly prominent discourse has been the
“greed versus grievance” debate (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Ostby 2008), situated largely within
the political science literature. This debate has demonstrated the potential importance – and
nuance – of inequality on conflict.
The “greed versus grievance” debate encompasses two camps of scholars, one of which
asserts the importance of opportunism in conflict onset (e.g., Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier
and Hoeffler 2004), and the other of which asserts the importance of grievances and inequality
(e.g., Ostby 2008; Cederman et al. 2011). Grievance scholars had long posited the relevance of
inequality on mass violent conflict, referencing events like the Arab Spring, in which social
inequalities and political non-representation played a major role (Ansani and Daniele 2012;
Willems 2012), and the genocide in Rwanda, in which ethnic division and unequal treatment
erupted into mass violence (Willems 2012; Dallaire 2010). While these cases suggest a relatively
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straightforward relationship between inequality and conflict, empirical inquiry thus far indicates
that the relationship between inequality and conflict is characterized by nuance.
Indeed, empirical tests of this relationship often returned null or negative findings (e.g.,
Collier and Sambanis 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). These results
suggest that the relationship between inequality and conflict was, at best, uncommon or
inconsistent. In light of these findings, many scholars instead offered that having the opportunity
to acquire resources was more important to facilitating civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier
and Hoeffler 2004). Therefore, factors that facilitated opportunism (e.g., low average incomes,
little rule of law, large populations), were more indicative of these kinds of conflict. Proponents
of this “greed” framework argue that, when governmental capabilities to control rebellion are
weak and resources for rebels to gain are maximized, combatants are more likely to mobilize;
where conflict can happen, it will. These scholars suggest that leading actors are truly motivated
by resources like land and loot 6; though, they might employ revolutionary rhetoric and
propaganda to organize foot soldiers to conduct attacks (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Dallaire
2010). Researchers with this perspective highlight the importance of resource acquisition, but
downplay the relevance of inequality.
However, since the early-to-mid 2000s, some scholars have argued those findings do not tell
the entire story. Those findings, they contend, are muted by the researchers’ reliance on
traditional measures of inequality. Those who suggest inequality does not share a strong
relationship with conflict typically measure total, or absolute, inequality, and they typically use

6

It should be noted that loot, land, and other forms of resource acquisition are means to acquire power, which
is also the objective of grievance-driven fighters. It could therefore be hypothesized that, even when people engage
in violence for resource acquisition, they are rectifying underlying sources of inequality and “empowering”
themselves. Dallaire (2010) speaks to this somewhat when he discusses how some disenfranchised Rwandan youths
felt empowered through their recruitment and activity with their armed groups. Likewise, Collier, Hoeffler, and
Rohner make room for the possibility of this in some of their later work (Collier et al. 2009). However, the exact
process of grievance-into-acquisition, if it exists, has not yet been explicitly studied, and is left to speculation.
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the GINI coefficient to do so. The GINI coefficient is a commonly-implemented measure to
capture inequality, calculated by different major organizations such as the World Bank or the
United State Census Bureau. It is a measure of dispersion of income across the entire income
distribution (USCB 2019). The GINI coefficient is useful for describing how income is generally
distributed across a given country (e.g., whether one person receives all the income, or whether it
is evenly distributed amongst every person within a society). It is therefore a measure of absolute
economic inequality.
However, the GINI coefficient does not help researchers understand much about how income
(or any non-economic measure of inequality) is distributed between defined groups of people
within a given country (Stewart et al. 2010). This can be problematic if it is intergroup
inequality, or non-economic inequality, that is more relevant to conflict. The GINI coefficient is
a measure of vertical inequality, or total inequality between individuals and/or households in a
society, regardless of their cultural group affiliation (Stewart 2000). It is not, however, an
accurate, or even very well-correlated, measure of horizontal inequality (Stewart et al. 2010), or
relative inequality between two culturally-defined groups of people (Stewart 2008). This is
notable because horizontal inequality seems to bear a different relationship with conflict in the
literature. Studies comparing vertical and horizontal inequality’s effect on conflict have
overwhelmingly found vertical inequality to be uncorrelated with and non-predictive of conflict,
and horizontal inequality to be correlated with and predictive of conflict (e.g., Cramer 2003;
Mancini 2008; Ostby 2008; Cederman et al. 2013; EPDC 2015). Indeed, Gubler and Selway
(2012) find that, when inequality is horizontal, rather than vertical, rebel groups are twelve times
more likely to successfully recruit members.
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It should be noted that horizontal inequality concerns social, economic, and political
disparities between culturally-defined groups, not simply differences between economic haves
and have-nots. Culturally-defined groups describe the ways that people organize and identify
themselves within their societies: in the US, this often follows racial classifications, but in other
societies, identity politics might more closely follow religious, linguistic, or ethnic lines (and
often, these categories overlap with each other) (Gurr 1993). The specific way in which people in
the society organize in-groups and out-groups (e.g., religious, racial, etc.) is not as important as
the fact that such groupings exist and, often, dictate who has political power, economic
opportunities, and social advantage (Gurr 1993). Measures of horizontal inequality address how
well a given cultural group fares compared to others within its society. These measures are
prompted from the understanding that, by merit of being members of a certain cultural group,
such as a given ethnicity or religion, some people enjoy greater access to economic, political, and
social benefits. Likewise, by merit of being members of a different cultural group, others do not.
Distinguishing between “vertical,” or total inequality, and “horizontal,” or between-group
inequality, is not a completely novel concept in criminology 7. It is also not simply an issue of
measurement or semantics; rather, the two are conceptually different. Vertical inequality is the
absolute inequality within a society (i.e., how far the most well-off household or individual is
from the worst-off household or individual), while horizontal inequality is the relative inequality
between groups in a society (i.e., how one cultural group is positioned as compared to another
cultural group, on average). Therefore, the two are not simply alternate ways of measuring the
same concept. While horizontal inequality statistics can be decomposed from vertical inequality

7

Stolzenberg et al. (2016), for example, study the effects of interracial versus total inequality on violent crime. They
find that interracial inequality is predictive of violent crime, while total inequality does not have a strong association
with offending rates.
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statistics (and thus the two can have some correlation), a society’s level of vertical inequality is
not necessarily indicative of how much horizontal inequality there is (Stewart 2000). In fact, as
Stewart et al. (2010) find, the level of vertical inequality in a society is not a reliable indicator of
horizontal inequality, and the two are not strongly correlated.
To further observe the difference between vertical and horizontal inequality, it is worth
considering examples demonstrating that the levels of vertical and horizontal inequality present
in a society do not necessarily reflect each other. A society can have a large gap between its bestoff and worst-off individuals, indicating a high level of vertical inequality, but the structural
differences between groups can be relatively small, indicating a low level of horizontal
inequality. This can be seen at times in Kenya, where elites from various ethnic groups might
relate more to each other than worse-off members of their own ethnic groups (Stewart 2000). A
society can also appear to be fairly equal in terms of its absolute, or vertical, inequality, but show
strong cleavages across group lines where inequality exists, thus indicating a high level of
horizontal inequality. This can be seen in Nepal, where vertical inequality indicators suggest that
the society is fairly equal, while horizontal inequality indicators suggest large between-group
differences (Tiwari 2010). Then, there are societies with high rates of absolute and relative
inequality, such as Nigeria, where there are large overall disparities and significant disparities
between cultural groups (Kuznar 2019). It is also possible for societies to have low rates of
absolute and relative inequality, in which the total amount of inequality is very small and there
are no systematic differences between groups. While there are societies with comparatively low
vertical inequality, there are no societies without systematic differences between cultural groups.
Scandinavian countries, for instance, which are often known for their large welfare states and
might arguably provide the fairest example of this, still face clear divisions along ethnic and

14

immigrant lines for inequalities that exist socially, economically, and politically (Larsen 2011;
Galloway et al. 2015; Mock-Munoz de Luna et al. 2019).
Graphical depictions of these possible combinations can be found below in Figure 1. Figure 1
provides example depictions of a society with 1) high vertical inequality but low horizontal
inequality, 2) high vertical inequality and high horizontal inequality, 3) low vertical inequality
and low horizontal inequality, and 4) low vertical inequality but high horizontal inequality.
These depictions are simply examples to illustrate that vertical and horizontal inequality are not
perfectly reflective of each other nor necessarily strongly correlated. While in Figure 1, the
example variable measured is income in thousands, this choice is arbitrary and was made for the
sake of the example. Literacy rates, unemployment rates, or any other measure could have been
chosen. In box plots, the shaded box depicts the middle 50% of the observations, the lower
“whisker” depicts the bottom 25%, and the upper “whisker” depicts the upper 25%. The line in
the middle of the box is the 50th percentile. In societies with high vertical inequality, the distance
from the lower and upper whiskers are considerably far, irrespective of how cultural groups
compare to each other on average. In societies with high horizontal inequality, the better-off and
worse-off people in the population (in this example, the wealthier 50% and the poorer 50%) are
clearly divided along group lines. This is true regardless of whether there is much absolute (i.e.,
vertical) inequality. Likewise, in societies with low vertical inequality, there is not much distance
between the wealthiest and poorest groups of people, regardless of whether any existing
differences follow group lines. In societies with low horizontal inequality, groups do not fare
much differently than each other on average, regardless of whether there is much absolute
inequality present.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Vertical (Total) versus Horizontal (Intergroup) Inequality

Stewart (2000) applied the idea of horizontal inequality to conflict. She and other subsequent
authors (e.g., Stewart 2002; Stewart 2008; Ostby 2008; Cederman et al. 2013) explored the
relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict, ultimately producing results that differed
from those of previous scholars who measured vertical inequality. Rather than those scholars’
null findings, Stewart (2000) and others measuring horizontal inequality (e.g., Ostby 2008;
Mancini 2008; Cederman et al. 2013) found horizontal inequality to positively correlate with
conflict. Likewise, Stewart et al. (2010) do not find vertical and horizontal inequality to be
strongly correlated with each other. Murshed and Gates (2005) also note this lack of correlation
in the case of Nepal, in which the GINI coefficient indicates a fairly equal society, as opposed to
measures of grouped inequality, which indicate a much less equal country. From this literature, it
appears, the greater the disparities between two collective groups, the more likely conflict is to
16

occur. This further suggests that differentiating inequality by type (i.e., horizontal versus
vertical) is a worthwhile exercise.
Recognizing inequalities as “vertical” or “horizontal,” however, is not the only distinction
that is relevant for understanding how inequality relates to conflict. It is also important to
recognize the types of inequality that exist. These can be economic, such as in the case of the
income measure historically used to capture inequality, or they can be social or political (Stewart
2000)8. This delineation is important, because how people perceive their status in comparison to
others might depend on the kinds of inequality present within their society. That is, a social
inequality that clearly goes along group lines, such as one group being barred from schools or
healthcare institutions, might be more instigative than general differences in income that seem to
indiscriminately affect people across a society. If it is important to recognize inequalities as
horizontal or vertical, and also as social, political, or economic, then the GINI coefficient (a
measure of vertical, economic inequality) is a limited capture of inequality on two fronts. To this
point, Cramer (2003) argues that a measure of solely vertical, solely economic inequality is illprepared to capture the breadth of inequality and its effects.
Scholars, therefore, have studied not only horizontal inequality, but social horizontal
inequality, economic horizontal inequality, and/or political horizontal inequality. Doing so has
changed how we understand how inequality relates to conflict. One notable contribution is
Ostby’s 2008 paper, which is the first large-N study to examine the relationship between civil
conflict and empirical measures of horizontal inequality. Ostby (2008) finds that horizontal
social inequality might be especially relevant to conflict onset. This could be because social or
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Some scholars would also classify cultural inequalities as an independent analytical and theoreti cal kind of
inequality (Stewart 2002). However, cultural inequalities could also be arguably encompassed within social
inequalities. For the purposes of this paper, I define inequalities as social, economic, or political, and offer that
cultural inequalities are a facet of social ones.
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political inequalities across groups, such as disparities in access to education or the ability to
participate in political proceedings, are more likely to have explicit de jure support (and more
clearly so) than economic inequalities, such as differences in average income (Stewart 2008;
Ostby 2008). Similarly, a commonly-shared group identity could serve as a rallying tool,
unifying individuals and facilitating mobilization when inequality is present along this group line
(Gurr 1993; Stewart 2008).
Relatedly, Cederman et al. (2013) test the ability of political and economic horizontal
inequalities to predict conflict. They find political and economic horizontal inequalities both
predict conflict considerably better than political and economic vertical inequalities. Further,
they find political horizontal inequality to be a particularly strong predictor of conflict. Their
work corroborates the above literature, and their observation regarding the importance of
political horizontal inequality also contributes to the notion that de jure inequity could be
particularly relevant to conflict. Cederman et al.’s (2013) paper is also important because of its
implementation of horizontal political and economic inequality in an out-of-sample predictive
model. Some analyses that have identified variables as important to conflict do not perform well
when actually predicting it (Ward et al. 2013), so the ability of political and economic horizontal
inequality to predict conflict is notable.
The above studies, while not definitive, offer evidence for the idea that horizontal inequality
has the potential to inform whether mass violent conflict will occur. However, despite these
advancements, there remain several gaps in our understanding of how inequality relates to
conflict and why. First, several correlational analyses of horizontal inequality and conflict rely
heavily on mathematically-generated missing data (e.g., Ostby 2008; EPDC 2015). This data is
produced by taking assumptions that the authors make about what missing data should look like
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and using them to calculate what missing data would be, if those assumptions are true. For
example, Ostby (2008) assumes that inequality increases linearly over time in countries where
there are two or more observed data points, but that inequality does not change over time in
countries where there is only one observation. Assumptions such as these have previously been
used to impute missing data in cases where it is unavailable, but needed to increase sample size
and reduce type II error.
Correlational analyses that rely on imputed data can be informative, particularly as a
literature is developing, but it is difficult to confidently establish unbiased, generalizable
relationships from them (Kang 2013). This is because it is unclear from such analyses whether
the detected effect is a result of the assumed nature of the imputed data. It is also unclear to what
extent coefficients overestimate or underestimate relationships based on the imputed data, and
whether detected effects can be taken at face value and generalized beyond the sample.
Therefore, a cross-country analysis that exclusively relies on data that has been observed would
be advantageous to the development of the literature.
Second, authors in the literature so far have typically used only one indicator of horizontal
social or economic inequality to measure either. This could be because of 1) the preliminary
nature of many studies on horizontal inequality and conflict, 2) the many data restrictions across
countries on indicators relevant to horizontal inequality and group breakdowns (e.g., ethnic or
religious breakdown, etc.), or 3) both. Some countries, particularly those with a history of civil
conflict or an interest in censoring certain forms of data, restrict or outright ban data collection
on indicators such as ethnicity breakdowns (see Canelas and Gisselquist 2018 for a fuller
discussion). Thus, accessing sufficient data across enough countries for an analysis is a
challenge. This can clearly make obtaining uniform data across countries of interest difficult,
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subsequently reducing either the amount of possible variables that can be implemented in an
analysis or severely compromising sample size. Often, therefore, particularly in cross-country
studies, researchers use a single indicator for horizontal inequality. For example, they might
include only educational attainment as the measure of social inequality, or only income as the
measure of economic inequality.
The lack of comprehensive, cross-country measures of horizontal inequality is
understandable given the above context, but it is not without consequence. The single indicators
included in previous studies are not the only factors that contribute to economic or social power,
and measuring them exclusively does not offer a complete picture of what horizontal inequality
looks like on the ground. This is important, because the way a variable is measured can
significantly alter the estimations of a given model (Chevitsky 1991; Kreutz 2010).
Implementing a more comprehensive measure of social and economic horizontal inequality
should provide a more accurate picture of what grouped inequality looks like in a given society.
Studying the relationship between these more comprehensive measures and conflict could also
potentially provide different results from those noted in previous studies, and change what we
understand the relationship between inequality and conflict to be.
The third gap is that tertiary aspects of conflict (e.g., which groups engage in conflict,
conflict intensity, etc.) are understudied throughout the literature. Current research largely
features studies in which the research question is whether horizontal inequality causes initial
conflict onset. However, if horizontal inequality causes conflict initially, it is reasonable to
hypothesize that it also affects the nature of conflict, such as whether a conflict occurs in any
given year, or which groups engage in a conflict when it takes place. A study exploring
horizontal inequality’s effects on factors such as these, therefore, would be contributive to our
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understanding of horizontal inequality’s impact on not only conflict onset, but also conflict
dynamics.
Fourth, it appears that, even if inequality is a compelling influencer of conflict, it does not
operate in a vacuum. Other factors (e.g., governmental repression, collective framing, etc.) can
and do work alongside inequality to encourage or discourage conflict. Inequality can potentially
inform why some societies, rather than others, experience violent conflict. It might also inform
why a given society has periods of conflict and periods of peace. However, inequality often
changes incrementally over time, particularly when compared to violent outbreaks, which can
quickly escalate and change in intensity. Relatedly, there are societies, such as the U.S., with
considerable inequality, but that do not experience extended periods of civil conflict, as defined
in this paper and the larger literature (i.e., a contested incompatibility between two armed groups,
one of which is the state, resulting in 25 or more deaths within a calendar year). These issues
suggest that other factors (e.g., governmental repression, collective framing, etc.) work alongside
inequality to determine when a conflict occurs, and that inequality might be necessary, though
insufficient, to explaining why conflicts develop how, when, and where they do. Examining
confluent factors would help researchers better understand these outcomes. All of these gaps
within the literature on inequality will have to be addressed before theory on inequality and
conflict can be more complete.
2.3 Inequality in Practice: Mediating Factors and Other Causes of Conflict
Inequality might be a contributing factor to conflict, but it does not function unilaterally.
In practice, it appears, horizontal inequality could be a necessary but insufficient condition for
many civil conflicts. Other variables seem to work alongside inequality to either encourage or
prevent it from escalating into violent conflicts. Thus, while horizontal inequality appears to be a
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possible impetus for violent conflict, outside factors might still need to be “ideal” for it to occur.
Specifically, groups that would be in conflict need to frame the society’s inequality in a way that
begets violence as a response. Then, even after this framing has occurred, people need to have
the capacity to mobilize and engage in conflict. This is largely dependent upon their society’s
governmental structure, which must be sufficiently repressive to disallow legal means of
rebellion (e.g., peaceful protest; voting in free and fair elections), but also sufficiently open to
allow for groups to organize and mobilize (Gurr 1993; Muller 1985).
Some of these additional factors, which appear to mediate the effect of horizontal
inequality on conflict, are considerably understudied. There are few studies in which authors
directly relate collective framing (i.e., the process by which a collective group employs a
common narrative to explain a given situation) to mass civil conflict (but see Gamson 1995,
Oberschall 2002, and Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008 for examples), and even fewer data
with which to study it. Likewise, more work on how governmental structure affects the
horizontal inequality-conflict nexus would be useful. Works on this topic such as those of Gurr
(1993) have been instrumental in bettering scholars’ understandings of these matters; however,
there are still further opportunities for exploration.
2.3.1 Collective Framing
One factor that researchers have posited is important to the development of conflict is
collective framing, popularized by Snow et al. (1986) to describe the bridge connecting people’s
perceptions to their participation in a given movement. Collective framing is the phenomenon by
which a collective, or a defined group of people, employs a common narrative to explain a given
circumstance. In the context of violent conflict, collective framing is often implemented by a
group to frame some sort of grievance – real or perceived – as the fault of a given entity. The
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frame is constructed in such a way that it justifies conflict, such as through seeing the group as
under attack or without other, more peaceful options.
Several authors (e.g., Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Oberschall 2002; Gamson
1995) have described collective framing as the process by which groups of everyday people
rationalize participating in mass violent conflict. To do so, they often use case studies and
qualitative data to examine the phenomenon, describing instances in which groups of people use
common narratives to explain why they experience a given grievance. Notably, their work
recognizes the importance of either real or perceived grievances. Where many researchers in the
inequality literature measure objective inequality, authors of collective framing pieces often
explicitly articulate the importance of perceiving inequality. To quote Gamson (1995),
Emotions other than indignation can be stimulated by perceived
inequities…[However,] an injustice frame calls attention to a group of motivated
human actors who carry some of the onus for bringing about harm and suffering.
By defining a “they” who are responsible and can change things, adversarial
frames supply the target for indignation and action in a way that aggregate frames
cannot.
From a collective framing perspective, after a group experiences what they perceive to be an
injustice of some sort, they frame it to make sense of why it has happened. In the context of
conflict, this frame often attributes blame to a given entity, be it a government or another body.
The aggrieved group sees the outside entity as having caused an unjust scenario, and often uses
narratives of injustice or of being under attack to rationalize a response, which is frequently
framed as self-defensive in nature or the only option left9.
Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) document a compelling instance of collective
framing giving way to genocide in their case study of Darfur in the early 2000s. While genocide
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This is conceptually relevant to the notion in criminology of neutralization (Sykes and Matza 1957) and/or excuses
and justifications (Scott and Lyman 1968).
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often involves victimizing an unarmed group, constituting an act of violence against civilians
rather than armed conflict as defined in this paper and much of the literature, the Darfur case is
still useful for understanding how people can be motivated to engage in violence in response to
perceived inequality. In the Darfur case, Sudanese Arabs, who were traditionally nomadic, and
Sudanese blacks, who were traditionally settled and in control of water resources, had previously
cooperated in distributing water (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). However, when the
climate became drier and water sources depleted, narratives describing Sudanese blacks as
“greedy” spread and were promulgated by the Sudanese Arab-led government (Hagan and
Rymond-Richmond 2008). Formerly underdeveloped constructions of race became solidified,
and with them stereotypes of Sudanese blacks as venal, aggressive, and antagonistic (Hagan and
Rymond-Richmond 2008). These narratives then supported frames that Sudanese blacks were
unfairly targeting Sudanese Arabs via resource distribution. Frames of injustice, victimization,
and a need for self-defense cropped up and were popularized in everyday life, such as in
marketplace squares (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). As these depictions became more
entrenched, the water issue was framed as an attack on Sudanese Arab populations, which
demanded a response in self-defense. The genocide began soon thereafter.
The Darfur case is useful because it illustrates several commonly-employed frames. It
documents how collective frames can both build upon and encourage stereotyping, how violence
can arise out of either real or perceived inequalities, and how frames can be used to attribute
blame and imply the necessity of violence as a response. The case also demonstrates how
important sentiments of injustice and persecution are for instigating violent responses. As
Gamson (1995) states, “Only an injustice frame…taps the righteous anger that puts fire in the
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belly and iron in the soul.” The Darfur case alludes to the importance of collectively framing
group disparities to encourage mass violence.
The role collective framing plays in conflict onset is understudied, but it has been alluded
to in some of the inequality literature. Cramer (2003), for example, writes that ideological
mechanisms (amongst other factors like state strength 10) are important for a society to transition
from inequality into violent conflict. Stewart (2008) also posits that perceived inequalities, just
like objective ones, can lead to conflict onset. In these pieces, authors imply that the way people
make sense of their situation – not simply the presence of the situation in and of itself – is vital
for conflict onset.
Cederman et al. (2011; 2013) also implicate framing as relevant to conflict onset, in
addition to horizontal inequality. In their 2011 paper, they find when groups are both much
richer and much poorer than the society’s average, they are more likely to engage in conflict.
This could be indicative of groups framing the need to either protect their position in society or
fight perceived injustices. Cederman et al. (2013) discuss several conditions under which they
posit horizontal inequality must occur for conflict to potentially ensue. They argue that, after a
given inequality manifests, the aggrieved group must designate that inequality as unjust, and
“frame and blame” a given entity for its occurrence (Cederman et al. 2013). These conditions,
which fit the collective framing orientation, could help engender conflict.
Collective framing can help researchers approach contexts under which objectively
“better-off” groups commit acts of violence. Researchers can also employ the concept to
hypothesize why acts of violence break out at particular moments. While currently, the exact
mechanism by which collective framing works remains speculative, it could be that collective
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Several other authors also posit that the structure of the state plays a pivotal role in the likelihood of conflict onset.
See section 2.3.2 (“Governmental Structure”) for further discussion.
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frames are built up and strengthened after key rallying events (e.g., a political election; the
execution of a journalist). This could reinforce a given ideology (e.g., “We are unjustly treated,”
or “There is no other option.”), encourage a sense of urgency, and motivate people to act (Black
2011). It could also be that collective frames gain traction cyclically, similarly to protest cycles
(see Snow and Benford 1962 for a fuller discussion of protest cycles). In this case, groups would
violently or non-violently express their dissatisfaction with a given situation, become fatigued
from protesting after some amount of time or after they succeed in bringing about an
intervention, and then mobilize again as frames suggest that the problem is still present. While
the mechanism by which collective framing works is still unclear, several researchers (e.g.,
Gamson 1995; Oberschall 2002; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008) have noted its putative
important role in rationalizing and institutionalizing mass violence, including armed conflict.
More work is needed to empirically test this notion and better understand how collective framing
affects conflict.
It is worth considering how collective framing feeds into conflict, given its relevance in
several case studies (e.g., Gamson 1995; Oberschall 2002; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008).
Still, there is much researchers do not know about collective framing and conflict. A thorough
search of the literature reveals there are no aggregated empirical databases on collective framing.
It is therefore difficult to assess the generalizability of conclusions researchers have drawn about
its impact on violent conflict. There is also very little if any guidance on how to measure
collective frames to rectify this gap in the conflict literature. These and related challenges make
it difficult to explicitly measure collective frames, including in this current work (see Chapter 3.5
for a fuller discussion of study limitations). However, it is still important to recognize the
theoretical importance of perceived inequality and collective framing. Doing so influences the
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conclusions researchers draw from analyses (including the current one). It also allows
researchers to better theorize how factors that are explicitly measured, like inequality, relate to
conflict and under which conditions.
2.3.2 Governmental Structure
An additional factor that could alter the effect of horizontal inequality and be pivotal to
conflict development is the governmental civil structure of a given society. In the context of this
work, the governmental civil structure of a society refers to how repressive it is, and how
inclusive are its institutions. A society’s governmental civil structure can foment conflict if it is
sufficiently repressive and disallows people from engaging in legitimate political mobilization
(Ferguson 2006). It can also make conflict logistically possible, as the degree of governmental
repression present determines whether groups can meet and mobilize. (Gurr 1993; Muller 1985).
It is therefore important to consider a society’s government when thinking about the
development of violence.
A government’s level of repression and the development of its institutions can make
conflict more appealing for potential foot soldiers. Governmental repression and weak
institutions can inspire people to make demands for change (Ferguson 2006). When the
government attempts to quell these outbreaks and maintain its power with further repression, it
can reinforce and sustain the rebel narrative, protracting the conflict in a cycle of repression and
rebellion.
Thus far, the reviewed literature has been about conditions that make people want to
engage in conflict. However, it is equally important to recognize that people must be able to
engage in conflict. To this end, governmental civil structure is paramount. Muller (1985) finds
that, when governments are either extremely repressive or not very repressive at all, conflict is
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less likely. Instead, he demonstrates, moderately repressive regimes are most likely to experience
violent outbreaks.
The reason for this has to do with both the willingness to engage in violence (which is
increased by aforementioned horizontal inequalities and collective frames), and the ability to do
so. When people live under regimes that recognize and respect freedoms, such as the right to
peacefully protest or to hold free and fair elections, they are less likely to violently rebel, even
when they have grievances against the regime. This could be because they perceive there to be a
legitimate means by which they can participate in and change the political process, even if
gradually. Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) support this idea; though, they apply it to micro-level
actors and recommend “blocked opportunity theory” as a framework for understanding this
phenomenon. They too write that, when individuals perceive there to be legitimate opportunities
to access freedoms and pursue change, they are less likely to implement illegitimate means to do
so. However, when there are no legitimate avenues for change, people pursue those which are
illegitimate. This could help explain why non-repressive regimes lessen the effect of inequality
on conflict.
On the opposite extreme, under highly repressive regimes, people are still less likely to
rebel. Muller (1985) posits that this is because, even if they want to do so, extreme security
measures and punishments set in place by the state render mobilization infeasible. In highsecurity societies, such as North Korea, for example, where organization is instantly (and often
violently) quelled and people are encouraged to police each other, mobilization is far more
dangerous. The high risk of mobilization disincentivizes individuals from doing so. Instead, it
seems individuals are most likely to engage in violence under moderately repressive regimes, in
which people do not have enough access to freedoms to effect change, but can still find ways to
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meet with others and organize. This idea is supported by Acemoglu and Robinson (2013), who
caution that, when regimes offer some access to freedoms (e.g., economic freedoms to access
markets), but not others (e.g., political freedoms to engage in free and fair elections), instability
and conflict are more likely.
Muller’s (1985) and Gurr’s (1993) findings are corroborated by other literature in which
authors find that weak governmental institutions encourage conflict. Braithwaite et al. (2010),
Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Fearon and Laitin (2003) all speak to the relevance of poorlydeveloped governmental institutions, such as weak rule of law, on conflict. Through their use of
case studies and statistical analyses, they all ultimately find that weak governmental institutions
(and, in particular, weak rule of law) facilitate conflict by making its consequences less risky to
participants and making conflict more feasible.
It should be noted that, over the years, a government can change its level of repression.
That is, at some points in time, for example, a government might engage moderately repressive
tactics to quell rebellion, whereas at other points, it might employ more repressive tactics to do
so. It is important to remember in these discussions that governments can change the amount of
repression they employ, and this can be subsequently change the propensity for conflict.
It is important to consider the qualities of a given society’s government when examining
how and when inequality causes conflict. Certain governmental civil structures render conflict
both appealing and opportune. Conversely, the way some governments are organized makes
conflict much more challenging, even when people might otherwise choose to engage in it.
Authors analyzing the relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict, therefore, should
assess a government’s level of repression and the strength of its institutions, recognizing their
potential to deter conflict, even in the face of inequality.
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2.4 Why Violence? Why Here? Why Now?
The above research provides a guide for thinking about why conflicts happen, and when
and where they take place. Across the literature, authors identify a host of variables that might
factor into whether mass violent conflict occurs in a given society, and allude to some potential
methods for prevention. The implications are notable. In societies with real or perceived
horizontal inequality, with collective frames that assign a label of injustice to that inequality and
attribute fault to a given entity, and with repressive enough governments to limit freedoms but
still allow for mobilization, we can expect to see higher rates of mass violent conflict.
Importantly, in practice, none of the above factors operates in isolation. They all are
important factors in determining conflict and its dynamics. Inequality seems to give way to
societal grievances that demand to be addressed, particularly when it is present between groups
and, potentially, as social or political inequality. Repressive or exploitative governmental civil
structures might make conflict more or less feasible, depending on the level of repression.
Collective frames can make sense of inequality and repression in ways that impact how the
conflict develops. Thus, these factors are all important to consider when thinking about why a
society experiences conflict. Recognizing the broad array of variables influencing conflict
dynamics can help researchers better examine conflicts and think about how they might develop
in the real world.
Relevantly, while these explanations might help researchers assess where, why, and when
some conflicts break out, they might not work as explanations of why any given individual actor
engages in conflict. As Matsueda (2017) notes, micro- and macro-level factors can cause each
other. Still, even if horizontal inequalities and frames of injustice or self-defense motivate many
individuals to engage in conflict, others could involve themselves in a given conflict for different
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reasons, such as thrill, money, or identity. Instances of this have been described by Dallaire
(2010), Braithwaite et al. (2010), Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008), and Collier and
Hoeffler (2004). It is important to recognize that I focus on how the theorized key influencers
discussed in this chapter affect actors at the macro-level. At the individual level, it is difficult
within current research to clearly distinguish between someone who is motivated by, for
example, income inequality, social isolation, or some other grievance, versus someone who is
motivated by resources, identity, or some other benefit, since the latter motivations could
manifest in similar ways and with similar propaganda as the former. It is also possible that
individual motivations change as conflicts develop11. I (and many researchers in this area of
work) am interested in the causes of conflict at the macro-level, rather than as a micro-level
decision-making process. These analyses use macro-level variables to understand macro-level
outcomes, making up one of the possible mechanisms by which researchers can study macrolevel phenomena (Coleman 1990). Despite the complexities of individual decision-making, the
factors I discuss in this literature review are useful for thinking about the determinants of conflict
at the societal level. They provide a lens through which scholars can examine cases of violence
and non-violence. They may also be useful for theorizing about causes of conflict at the
individual level, but that would require different forms of data to verify.

2.5 The Research Gaps
Both policymakers and researchers have a compelling interest in understanding,
predicting, and mitigating conflict. Still, there are several research gaps in theory, data, methods,
policy implications, and policy implementation in peace and conflict studies (Cederman and
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Possibilities such as this are, in part, why some discussions of how to instill peace post-conflict differ from
discussions about what initially started the conflict (Braithwaite et al. 2010). It is also why, in some conflicts, it can
become unclear even to warring parties what is motivating particular groups (Powell 2015).
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Weidmann 2017; Hegre et al. 2017) that must be addressed. While researchers’ efforts described
above have made considerable headway in making sense of the relationship between inequality
and conflict, the scientific community should neither claim full confidence in nor full
understanding of this relationship. The data limitations permeating the field are acute, and, in
many cases, persistent. Conceptual gaps still exist, and further study is required to deepen
researchers’ understandings of the manner in which inequality affects conflict dynamics.
Addressing these limitations will help make studies on horizontal inequality and conflict more
compelling. In this dissertation, I address several of these gaps.
2.5.1 Limited Conceptualizations of How Inequality Affects Conflict Dynamics
Perhaps as a result of poor data quality, limited measures of horizontal inequality, and the
literature’s relative newness, there is a lack of definitive, generalizable evidence on if and how
horizontal inequality affects 1) conflict, or 2) the dynamics of conflict. It is unclear whether
social, economic, and political horizontal inequality each have the same effect on conflict, or if
their effects systematically differ. It is also unclear whether horizontal inequality between any
groups causes conflict, or if horizontal inequality is only consequential between certain groups
(e.g., the largest groups, the best- and worst-off groups, etc.), as has been discussed in passing12
within the literature (Ostby 2008; Cederman et al. 2011). It is also unclear whether horizontal
inequality simply causes conflict (assuming it does), or whether characteristics of the inequality
also affect the nature of the conflict (e.g., who is involved in the conflict, how intense it is, etc.).
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Ostby (2008) examines differences between the two largest groups in a given society, positing that such
differences are most likely to be consequential. Cederman et al. (2011) find that the richest and poorest groups in a
society are both likely to engage in fighting where there is horizontal inequality, allowing for the suggestion that
these two groups’ differences could be particularly relevant to conflict. However, there is little systematic study of
which groups’ differences are most important to conflict, if any groups are special at all.
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If researchers better understood whether and how the effects of different types of
horizontal inequality vary, they could better identify situations that are most at-risk of escalating
into violence, and tailor policies to be more effective. As well, if there were better evidence
regarding whether and how horizontal inequality relates to conflict dynamics, policymakers
would be better-positioned to focus attention on preventing and mitigating the most urgent
situations.
I address some of these gaps in current conceptualizations of the relationship between
horizontal inequality and violent conflict. I do so by incorporating social, economic, and political
inequality into cross-country analyses; analyzing every relevant societal group’s relative
inequality; and examining the relationship between horizontal inequality and two conflict-related
outcomes (conflict occurrence and group involvement in conflict). I also rely on existing data to
limit the amount of methodological assumptions related to missing data, and implement more
comprehensive measures of horizontal inequality than have been used in previous cross-country
analyses.
2.5.2 Compelling Results with Questionable Data
Due to low sample size and missing data, some previous researchers have had to
interpolate missing data on horizontal inequality statistics (e.g., Ostby 2008; EPDC 2015). These
generated data were then used to estimate the relationship between horizontal inequality and
conflict. While this is a useful route for examining difficult-to-study phenomena, it places
limitations on what researchers should confidently assert is known about horizontal inequality.
To this point, Ostby (2008) notes that, while her results suggest researchers should refrain from
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considering the inequality-conflict relationship null13, her data have shortcomings and “must be
regarded as preliminary” (Ostby 2008). Interpolated data requires considerable assumptions
about how inequality between groups changes over time. For instance, the interpolation might be
based on the assumption that horizontal inequality is constant, or that it changes linearly over
time (Ostby 2008).
Researchers do not have enough information with which to confidently make such
assumptions. As has been noted in the literature, we lack a clear understanding of what
inequality between groups looks like on the ground (Canelas and Gisselquist 2018). This is
especially true in the context of speculating about how inequality across groups changes over
time and in different countries. Generated data are grounded in these kinds of assumptions.
The issues arising from generated data are particularly notable because, when analyses
are replicated with the original data, many of the results do not hold (Ostby 2008; EPDC 2015).
Given qualitative work demonstrating a relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict
in several cases (e.g., Stewart 2002; Stewart 2008; Tiwari 2010), it is reasonable to speculate, as
have the above authors, that these non-findings stem from poor power due to low sample size.
However, researchers cannot rule out the possibility that data constructed using debatable
assumptions could have generated biased findings. Results could inaccurately describe the
substantive strength of the relationship, the significance of the relationship, or the direction of the
relationship. Findings emerging from these data, therefore, cannot be considered definitive,
despite the fact that such findings have driven subsequent research publications and policy briefs.

Ostby’s (2008) paper comes at a time in which much of the political science literature is disqualifying the
relationship between inequality and conflict, due in large part, many scholars would argue, to the literature’s onedimensional conceptualization and operationalization of inequality.
13

34

In some of these products, horizontal inequality is often described as definitively causing
conflict, and policy recommendations are issued based off of this understanding.
In part because of these data limitations, it is important to continue exploring the
relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics with varied data and
methodological strategies to corroborate and build upon our scientific understanding of the topic.
In the current work, I use available census data to study the relationships of interest. I also use
cultural groups as the unit of analysis, helping to extend sample size without having to estimate
missing data values (see Chapter 3, “Methodology,” for a fuller explanation). While these steps
do not resolve the issue of limited data or small sample sizes, they offer another way to analyze
the relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics. These perspectives, in
combination with previous studies’, can help produce a fuller understanding of the relationship.
2.5.3 Measuring Horizontal Inequality
Researchers’ understanding of horizontal inequality has been adversely affected by their
limited ability to measure it. In some countries, there are considerable restrictions on data access
(Canelas and Gisselquist 2018). Concerns about reigniting conflicts, interests in maintaining a
given power structure, and logistical barriers lessen how much data social scientists can acquire
for analysis (Canelas and Gisselquist 2018). For example, in a society where there has
historically been violence related to ethnic cleavages, the government might restrict access to
data. Power allocation can be another concern: to prevent potential documentation of unequal
power structures and lessen the likelihood of even peaceful movements to change that structure,
powerbrokers might block access to data. Finally, logistical barriers can hinder data collection
efforts. Researchers might not be able to access geographically- or linguistically-isolated groups,
even when they would otherwise be allowed to do so. Canelas and Gisselquist (2018) offer
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examples of when these obstacles have prevented researchers from adequately collecting
horizontal inequality measures, such as in the examples of Tanzania or Rwanda, where
governments have tried to encourage identification with national identities as opposed to ethnic
ones.
The result of these obstacles has been that researchers who want to quantitatively analyze
horizontal inequality’s relationship with conflict have had to rely on data sources that were not
collected for the purposes of measuring horizontal inequality. Because horizontal inequality
studies were not their intended purpose, these data sources have fewer variables of interest. A
general health survey, for example, which might be useful for studying grouped inequality on
health outcomes, might not be useful for studying the effect of political or economic horizontal
inequality. Readily available data also might not allow for optimal operationalization of certain
variables. For instance, if a census only collects summary birth history (i.e., how many children a
mother has ever had and how many are currently alive), calculating infant or child mortality rates
for each relevant group could prove difficult. Data sources adapted for the study of horizontal
inequality can also be limited in their applicability for cross-country analyses. For example, if
census data is used to assess group differences, countries can only be included in the same
analyses if both countries measure the same outcomes. If one country, however, collects
household incomes and another does not, household incomes cannot be used for an analysis that
features both countries.
Relatedly, while there are suggested practices for calculating inequality measures
between groups (e.g., Stewart et al. 2010), none, to my knowledge, suggest practices regarding
which indicators to include. For example, to measure economic inequality between groups, some
authors have used differences in income, whereas others have used differences in ownership of
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domestic assets (e.g., Ostby 2008; Cederman et al. 2013). Relatedly, researchers have often only
used a single indicator to represent economic or social inequality comprehensively. This practice,
however, risks depicting an incomplete picture of what inequality looks like on the ground.
Such restrictions have created a context in which there is limited data on horizontal
inequality. There is consequently an incomplete understanding of its relationship with conflict.
To address this, researchers would be well-served to reimagine currently available data into more
comprehensive measures of horizontal inequality. This would mean including additional
indicators of horizontal inequality into their analyses to help more accurately reflect what
inequality looks like in reality.
It is possible for researchers to employ currently available data to calculate more
comprehensive measures of horizontal inequality. I attempt to fill this gap in this dissertation by
including several indicators of social and economic horizontal inequality, as opposed to a single
one (see Chapter 3, “Methodology,” for a fuller discussion). Scholars such as Kreutz (2010) and
Chesher (1991) have noted that the way in which a variable is measured can dramatically impact
estimations of an effect. Implementing more comprehensive measures, therefore, could
potentially change how we estimate and understand horizontal inequality’s effect on conflict
dynamics.
Even though data is restricted to the countries that make it accessible, analyzing even just
these countries can provide a foundation from which we can theorize about how horizontal
inequality might affect conflict dynamics generally. Having different perspectives on and tests of
a given concept provides more well-rounded evidence on how it relates to other variables,
particularly when data is limited. Therefore, implementing more comprehensive measures of
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horizontal inequality in a cross-country analysis of its effect on violent conflict dynamics would
still improve our understanding of inequality and conflict.
There are several challenges to scholars’ understanding of horizontal inequality and
conflict. In this dissertation, I address several of them. I examine the effects of political, social,
and economic horizontal inequality on two dependent variables, conflict occurrence and group
involvement in conflict. I incorporate more comprehensive measures of horizontal inequality
than have been used in previous cross-country analyses, and I rely exclusively on existing data to
generate my results. By taking these steps, I am able to describe what the relationship between
horizontal inequality and conflict looks like in cases where the two have been explicitly
observed, inform theory on whether horizontal inequality affects not only conflict onset but also
conflict dynamics, and contribute to the broader discussion of what causes violent conflict.
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY
3.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses
As research on conflict determinants has developed, scholars (e.g., Gurr 1993; Stewart
2002; Cederman et al. 2011) have suggested that inequality between culturally-defined groups
could be particularly relevant to the onset of conflict. Researchers, therefore, have begun to study
this particular manifestation of inequality and its relationship with conflict. Stewart (2008),
Ostby (2008), and Cederman et al. (2011) have suggested that the effect of intergroup inequality
might also change depending upon whether it is manifested as economic, social, and political
inequality; therefore, it is important to study the effects of all of these.
Because of the youth of the literature and field-wide data limitations, it is useful to
continue to study the relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict. It is also
worthwhile to expand this area of research to more thoroughly consider the effects of horizontal
inequality on the dynamics of conflicts, such as which groups become involved in conflict. To
begin exploring this path, I employ census data to create several indicators each of social and
economic horizontal inequality. I examine these indicators’ effects on both whether conflict
occurs in any given year and which groups become involved in that conflict. I do this to 1)
provide evidence for whether, given existing data, there appears to be a correlation between
different kinds of horizontal inequality and these conflict dynamics, 2) explore the possibility
that horizontal inequality affects the nature of a conflict (e.g., which groups become involved),
and 3) examine whether there appear to be differences in correlations depending upon the type of
horizontal inequality present within a society and which indicators are used to examine it.
Researchers have incorporated very limited captures of horizontal inequality into crosscountry analyses, and have not, to my knowledge, included political, economic, and social
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horizontal inequality indicators into one cross-country analysis to note any differences in effect.
There are also relatively few studies whose results are generated from unaltered data. Because of
these limitations, it remains unclear whether the purported effects of horizontal inequality change
depending on the nature of that inequality, or how strong the relationship between horizontal
inequality and conflict is generally. Researchers have also not yet examined whether and how
experiences of inequality affect which groups become involved in conflict. Finally, there is not a
clear understanding of how other potential variables might work alongside horizontal inequality
to influence conflict and its dynamics.
To address some of these gaps, I incorporate different, underutilized measures of
horizontal inequality to analyze the relationship between political, social, and economic
horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics. I also examine an understudied dependent variable,
group involvement. Doing so helps determine 1) whether there is a relationship between
horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics besides its initial onset, and 2) whether who gets
involved in conflict is one of those dynamics. In these ways, I expand the knowledge-base on
horizontal inequality and its subsequent effects on conflict dynamics.
To this end, I address two central research questions:
1) What is the extent to which social, and economic, and political horizontal inequality
correlate with violent conflict?
2) What is the extent to which social, and economic, and political horizontal inequality
correlate with group involvement in violent conflict?
These questions and the methods through which I address them differ from former
studies in several ways. By incorporating “group involvement” as a dependent variable, I assess
how horizontal inequality might affect how a conflict develops. By incorporating more
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comprehensive measures of social and economic horizontal inequality, I attain a more holistic
view of how inequality looks on the ground and how it relates to conflict. Addressing these
issues in this way allows for a better understanding of how each type of inequality’s effect on
conflict dynamics differ from the others’, if at all.
Herein, I address the following hypotheses:
H1: Political, social, and economic horizontal inequality increase the likelihood of violent
conflict.
H2: Social and political horizontal inequality increase the likelihood of violent conflict
more than economic inequality.
H3: Groups that experience the most extreme horizontal inequality are most likely to
engage in conflict.
I address the above hypotheses by reimagining available data, creating new aggregate measures
of horizontal inequality, and using exclusively existing data. I then discuss these findings in the
larger context of the peace and conflict literature, and analyze how we can use them to advance
our understanding of why conflict develops in the manner it does.
3.2 Variables and Data Sources
For my analysis, I used some existing variables and created others. These data largely
come from three sources, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UPCD)/Peace Research Institute
of Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset (Petterson et al. 2019; Gleditsch et al. 2002), IPUMSInternational (Minnesota Population Center 2019a), and Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Core
Dataset 2018 (Vogt et al. 2015). As I enumerate the variables of interest in this section, I note
and describe any additional data sources as needed. Important to note is that the unit of analysis
for this study is cultural group, by country and by year. That is, each observation in the dataset is
a given group in a given country in a given year.
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3.2.1 Dependent Variables
There are two key dependent variables: conflict occurrence and group involvement in
conflict. For the purposes of this study, and in line with the UPCD/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset’s definition, I define conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the
government of a state, results in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths in a calendar year”
(Petterson et al. 2019; Gleditsch et al. 2002).

The first dependent variable is conflict occurrence. It is the outcome variable to address
hypotheses one and two (“Political, social, and economic horizontal inequality increase the
likelihood of violent conflict,” and “Social and political horizontal inequality increase the
likelihood of violent conflict more than economic inequality,” respectively). Conflict occurrence
is indicated as a 1 for years in which a conflict occurred, and 0 for years in which no conflict
occurred. This variable is taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 19.1,
which is a renowned dataset tracking when conflicts occur, as well as different qualities
surrounding them (e.g., intensity, duration, involved parties) (Petterson et al. 2019; Gleditsch et
al. 2002). The UPCD/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset is established as a reliable source of conflict
data, featuring few if any errors in where and when conflicts occurred (Eck 2012). Its data has
been used in prior studies exploring conflict onset (e.g., Ostby 2008).
Conflict occurrence is an indication of whether conflict (a contested incompatibility
between a state and non-state actor resulting in 25+ deaths in a calendar year) occurred in a given
year. To gather this data, the UCDP research team searched through media sources (e.g., news
reports) and non-media sources (e.g., historical archives, truth commission reports,
intergovernmental organizations’ reports, etc.) (DPRC 2020). They used these sources to
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estimate the number of battle-related deaths in a potential conflict in countries around the world.
They recorded an indication of whether the country meets at least 25 battle-related deaths in a
calendar year (yes or no). While the dataset’s estimates are evaluated by multiple human coders
and the dataset is widely implemented in the literature (e.g., Bosetti and von Einsiedel 2015;
World Bank 2020), it should be noted that these are estimates and there can be discrepancies
between this dataset’s and others’ estimates of direct battle deaths14.
The second dependent variable is group involvement in conflict. This variable is used to
address hypothesis three (“Groups that experience the most extreme horizontal inequality are
most likely to engage in conflict.”). This variable is also created based on information from the
UPCD/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Petterson et al. 2019; Gleditsch et al. 2002). It is a
dichotomous variable, indicating whether a given group is involved (1) or not involved (0) in the
conflict. Including this variable helps characterize the relationship between horizontal inequality
and violent conflict, indicating whether certain kinds of differences are more relevant to conflict
involvement than others.
To code this variable, I looked at the UCDP/PRIO’s record of which warring armed
groups were primarily involved in a conflict. I then verified which cultural groups these armed
parties professed to represent and fight for, and assigned those cultural groups a 1 if they were a
named primary party and a 0 if not. For example, Guatemala’s Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)
was a warring party involved in the Guatemalan conflict in 1981 (Petterson et al. 2019; Gleditsch
et al. 2002), and it was largely made up of and fighting for indigenous Guatemalans and their

14

For example, in Colombia in 1980, when the conflict was comparatively less intense, the Colombian National
Center for Historical Memory records less than 25 combatant deaths for the year 1980 in Colombia (CNMH 2013).
However, because there is no inequality data for this year, possible discrepancies do not affect the final analysis,
even with this year coded as a “0.”
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rights (Lawton 2015). Thus, Guatemala’s culturally-relevant ethnic group “indigenous” received
a code of 1 in 1981 in Guatemala.
3.2.2 Independent Variables – Horizontal Inequality
The key independent variables for this analysis are captures of social, economic, and
political inequality between groups. Political horizontal inequality is conceptualized as the
degree of unequal power relations between groups within the political system. It captures the
amount of political power that a given group has. Political horizontal inequality is coded as a
categorical variable, whereby a group can hold all political power (1 – constituting a
“monopoly”), most political power (2 – constituting a “dominance”), a share of political power
(3 – constituting either a “senior partner” or “junior partner”), or be excluded from the political
system (4 – constituting either “powerless,” “discrimination,” or “self-exclusion”). This variable
comes from the EPR Core dataset 2018 (Vogt et al. 2015), which captures political horizontal
inequality in every country around the world and details relevant cultural groups’ access to
political power. Group categorizations can change in subsequent years as the political landscape
develops.
The EPR Core dataset has historically been informative to studies examining political
inequality between groups. Despite the name, groups in this dataset are not exclusively “ethnic”
in more colloquial terms, whereby ethnicity indicates the groups’ countries of origin. The dataset
extends “ethnic” to include ethnoreligious, ethnolinguistic, and racial groups, as is culturally
relevant to the society (Vogt et al. 2015). The EPR Core Dataset tracks each relevant groups’
access to power, indicating for example whether a group has a monopoly of power, occupies
most executive positions, occupies a minority of executive positions, holds no political power
(but without explicit discrimination), is explicitly discriminated, or self-excludes from the
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political process (for instance, by claiming independence from the central government) (Vogt et
al. 2015) The categorizations were determined by an expert survey of roughly one hundred
regional experts and then reviewed and evaluated by the dataset’s management committee (Vogt
et al. 2015). This dataset has been used in former studies, like that of Cederman et al.’s (2013), to
examine political horizontal inequality’s relationship with civil war.
Social horizontal inequality is conceptualized as differences between groups vis-à-vis
communal benefits of the society and access to public services. Economic horizontal inequality
is conceptualized as differences between groups regarding financial well-being. Researchers in
peace and conflict studies have measured economic and social horizontal inequality in a host of
ways, and there is not a consensus on which indicators are most appropriate to implement. There
is also no well-established dataset measuring social and economic horizontal inequality: authors
have historically created their own indicators based off of measures they think accurately capture
social or economic status. One of the gaps I seek to fill is that of historically limited captures of
social and economic horizontal inequality in cross-country analyses. As Stewart et al. (2010)
write, including a wide range of indicators is preferable, since horizontal inequalities can differ
across indicators, and which inequalities are most pertinent to a society can differ between
societies 15. Therefore, to gain a more complete picture of economic and social horizontal
inequality in my analysis, I incorporate several indicators of each.
I implement three measures of social horizontal inequality (i.e., group differences in child
mortality rates, literacy rates, and educational attainment) and three measures of economic
horizontal inequality (i.e., group differences in unemployment, access to electricity, and home
ownership), all of which are detailed below. Each measure is meant to capture an aspect of social

15

For example, land equity might be more consequential in Zimbabwe than it is in China (Stewart et al. 2010).
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and economic status, respectively. Because it is unclear which, if any, indicator relates to violent
conflict and to what degree (particularly with unaltered data16), I retain each indicator as its own
variable for the purpose of the analysis. Doing so allows me to determine whether and to what
extent estimated correlations differ when different measures of horizontal inequality are
employed.
To measure each indicator of social and economic horizontal inequality, I almost 17
exclusively use existing census data 18 from each country. This data has been compiled and
harmonized by IPUMS-International (Minnesota Population Center 2019a). IPUMS is a wellestablished project by the Minnesota Population Center. It collects, harmonizes, and distributes
data collected by various organizations and countries. IPUMS-International (intuitively, its
international branch) does this for census data gathered from around the world.
Inequality along the aforementioned indicators are all operationalized in the same way: as
a given group’s average distance from the national average. That is, each indicator is the absolute
value19 of a group’s average rate subtracted from the national average’s rate. Therefore, if the
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Some researchers (e.g., Ostby 2008; EPDC 2015) have found certain measures of horizontal inequality to have a
positive relationship with violent conflict when using interpolated data, but this relationship becomes unapparent
with unaltered data and smaller Ns.
17 The one exception to this is Bangladesh. To calculate Bangladesh’s child mortality rates by group, I used IPUMSDemographic and Health Survey’s (DHS) data (Boyle et al. 2019), since number of children born and number of
children survived were not gathered through Bangladesh’s census. However, even this piece of data is collected,
harmonized, and distributed by IPUMS, which is the data source that did so for every other social and economic
indicator.
18 Because IPUMS provides a sample of each census, I calculated variables using the final weights indicated by
IPUMS, even when the sample was indicated as a simple random sample. I then verified population estimates I
generated against actual populations at the time of the census to ensure that they were consistent and ensure external
validity. I also verified that group demographic breakdowns in my dataset were consistent with official reports as a
way of ensuring external validity.
19 While I note that the relative position of a group (i.e., whether it is better- or worse-off than the national average)
might have an effect on that group’s involvement in conflict, I am hypothesizing that greater horizontal inequality
increases the likelihood of involvement in conflict. Therefore, as an initial step on this exploratory topic, I am testing
for whether there is evidence for or against this hypothesis. Future researchers might look to additional qualities
surrounding the group, like whether a group is better- or worse-off, rather than simply how far from average it is
(see Chapter 5 for a fuller discussion, and Appendix C for preliminary analyses).
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national average literacy rate is, for example, coded as a value of 0.5, and the group average is
0.3, then educational attainment inequality for that group is coded at 0.2 for that year.
Social horizontal inequality is conceptualized as differences between groups regarding
communal benefits of the society, such as healthcare or education. It concerns disparities in
societal indicators of human development and access to services, rather than economic
inequality, which revolves around financial disparities, or political inequality, which revolves
around access to political power and expression. As noted, it is operationalized as a given
group’s distance from the national average on a given measure.
To capture social horizontal inequality, I measure differences in child mortality rates,
literacy rates, and educational attainment. Child mortality rates have been used as an indicator of
horizontal inequality once before, where it was found to be informative to violence in Indonesia
(Mancini 2008). It could provide insight as to systematic differences in health between groups,
since children do not pass of natural causes. However, it has never, to my knowledge, been
included in any cross-country analysis of horizontal inequality and conflict. It is typically not
included in analyses on the topic, and constitutes an understudied facet of horizontal inequality
that might be informative to different aspects of violent conflict.
I also measure differences in literacy rates and educational attainment. Educational
attainment has been used before as a gauge of social horizontal inequality (e.g., Ostby 2008;
EPDC 2015), and is appropriate because of its indication of whether, on average, one group has
received more schooling than other groups. Literacy rates are useful because they likely reflect
quality of schooling. For example, even if everyone completed primary school (and thus had
similar values for educational attainment), some groups could still have higher literacy rates than
others because of differences in quality of instruction and educational infrastructure. To obtain
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educational attainment for each country, I calculated the amount of people between ages 20-29
who had completed university 20 over the total amount of 20-29 year olds. Relatedly, I measure
group differences in literacy rates by calculating the total amount of people who affirm that they
can read and write over the total amount of people. Combined, these three indicators provide a
broader picture of grouped social inequalities than have been previously captured in crosscountry analyses on the topic. They also serve as a gauge for overall social disparities between
relevant groups within a society.
Economic horizontal inequality is conceptualized as disparities between groups that occur
across financial lines, including access to the consumer market or disparities in wealth. These
inequalities largely concern financial well-being. It, too, is operationalized as a given group’s
distance from the national average on a given economic measure (i.e., unemployment rates,
access to electricity, home ownership rates).
I employed three economic indicators to measure economic horizontal inequality:
differences in unemployment rates, access to electricity, and home ownership rates. When
combined, these indicators can provide a more comprehensive assessment of differences in
economic outcomes between relevant groups in a society. Differences in access to electricity has
been included in other horizontal inequality studies as a component of disparities in ownership of
domestic assets (e.g., Ostby 2008). Home ownership also provides insight into how groups differ
in their systematic possession of assets. Likewise, it can reflect systematic underlying differences

20

I originally calculated educational attainment in three different ways to be able to compare slightly different
operationalizations’ effects. Therefore, I calculated the percentage of 20-29 year olds in the national population and
in each cultural group that had completed primary school, high school, and university. In each operationalization,
the detected effects were similar. Thus, I used only educational attainment as the percentage of 20-29 year olds who
had completed university in my final models.
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in wealth. Unemployment rates are included because they provide a way to get at differences in
income and job opportunities.
To include indicators of economic and social horizontal inequality, I had to calculate
them using census data harmonized by IPUMS-International (Minnesota Population Center
2019a). This is because such indicators are not widely and readily-available, as data on
horizontal inequality is still quite limited and researchers are still relying on data that was not
collected for the purpose of studying horizontal inequality. Some researchers have used data
from the Demographic and Health Surveys for horizontal inequality measures; however, I
employed IPUMS-International because it provides additional indicators that have not yet been
incorporated in cross-country analyses. Including them thereby allowed me to expand horizontal
inequality indicators beyond what the current literature features in many cross-country analyses.
Because of the size of the census sample datasets, I downloaded each country’s census as
a unique dataset. I calculated economic and social horizontal inequality indicators for each
census dataset and then merged my calculated indicators into a final dataset for analysis. Dataset
creation and analysis was conducted in Stata 15.1. Because IPUMS-International provides the
questions and possible responses asked in each census, I was able to verify that each indicator
included in the current study was gathered in a uniform way across countries and years. For
example, because I calculated literacy rates, as opposed to having them provided by IPUMSInternational, I was able to verify that “Can you read/write?” was the question asked in each
country in each year, with possible responses of “Yes” or “No.” IPUMS-International also
maintains consistency through its harmonization process for questions such as those addressing
educational attainment, where cultural contexts might make it difficult to achieve comparable
responses in their raw form. For example, asking respondents in two different countries about
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their highest level of schooling might be difficult to compare if respondents provide grade levels
that do not exist as such in other countries’ schooling systems. To make these variables
comparable, IPUMS creates one “harmonized” variable, which takes a uniform coding scheme
IPUMS designs (Minnesota Population Center 2019b). In the above example, both respondents
could receive a 1, indicating “completed primary school,” to indicate the equivalence of their
schooling levels and facilitate comparability. IPUMS datasets also include the underlying, or
“source,” variables, which provide the respondents’ original, un-harmonized answers, for
reference by subsequent researchers. These factors contribute to the reliability of the data
provided by IPUMS, as noted by Jeffers et al. (2017), and allowed me to ensure that my
calculated rates were comparable and consistent across countries and years.
Social horizontal inequality indicators were measures of how far a given cultural group
was from the national average in terms of its child mortality rates, literacy rates, and educational
attainment. As noted, IPUMS-International provides a sample of censuses from countries around
the world. While most of these samples are simple random samples (Minnesota Population
Center 2020), some have, for example, differential weighting. IPUMS-International provides
appropriate final weights to use in its datasets to calculate variables with minimal sampling error.
To calculate each indicator, I applied the final population weights provided by IPUMSInternational to each census’s dataset. This expanded each dataset to full-sized captures of each
country’s census. To remain consistent in my methods and ensure that I weighted the data
correctly, I applied weights to every dataset, including simple random samples, which were
representative of the population even before weighting (Minnesota Population Center 2020). As
a way of checking my calculations and maintaining external validity, I used my applied
population weights to calculate the total population of each country in each year in the dataset,
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and verified my estimated population counts against each countries’ official counts in each year
to make sure they were similar. Congruently, I also calculated ethnic breakdowns of each
country (see section 3.3 for a fuller discussion of how a country’s relevant cultural groups were
determined and coded) and compared them with official breakdowns to ensure they were similar
and to ensure external validity.
After the data was weighted, I calculated the child mortality rates, literacy rates, and
educational attainment of 1) each country in each year, and 2) each cultural group in each
country in each year. To calculate child mortality rates, I was required to use summary birth
history from census data. Censuses often record summary birth history, which details the total
amount of children a woman has ever had and how many of them are alive at the time of the
census, as opposed to full birth histories, which would also include the age at death of a given
child (UN IGME 2013). With summary birth histories, calculating child mortality as simply the
amount of deceased children divided by the total amount of children ever born could be
problematic, since older women could answer for adult children. Therefore, to mitigate this issue
and still capture an estimation of child mortality rates, I restricted the age of the mother to 20-29
at the time of census. This practice is consistent with the literature on this topic (Wilson and
Wakefield 2018; UN IGME 2013), and makes it virtually impossible for mothers to count adult
children in their responses. I therefore calculated child mortality rates by dividing the number of
deceased children of women aged 20-29 over the number of total children ever born to these
women. I did this at the national level to calculate national averages, as well as by groups in each
country for each census year.
I originally calculated educational attainment in three different ways to be able to
compare slightly different operationalizations’ effects. That is, I calculated the percentage of 20-
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29 year olds in the national population and in each cultural group that had completed primary
school, high school, and university 21. I then took the absolute value of the difference between
each group’s average rate and the national average, to see how distant a given group was from its
country’s average. The difference for each indicator was used in the final dataset as the indicator
of horizontal inequality in terms of educational attainment. Likewise, to calculate literacy rates, I
divided the total number of people who could read and write over the total number of people,
both again for the national population and each cultural group in each country in each year. The
absolute value of the difference between each group and its country’s national average
comprised the observation for that group in the given year.
Indicators for economic horizontal inequality were calculated in a similar manner as for
social horizontal inequality. After weighting the data by using the process described above, I
calculated the economic indicators: the absolute value of a group’s difference from its country’s
national average in terms of its unemployment rates, home ownership rates, and access to
electricity rates.
I calculated unemployment rates in a way that was consistent with the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics’ (2015) measure and divided the number of people in the active workforce who
were reported as unemployed at the time of the census over the total number of people in the
active workforce. On the censuses, the “active workforce” is made up of those who are
considered “employed” or “unemployed.” The employed are those who worked for pay within
the week of the census, maintained a family business, or were temporarily absent from their
regular jobs because of some personal reason such as vacation (BLS 2015). The unemployed are
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Each operationalization produced similar effects throughout the model-building process. Therefore, I only
retained the operationalization of the percentage of 20-29 year olds who had completed university in my final
analyses.
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those who did not have a job at all during the week of census and had made at least one attempt
to find a job within the past month, and those who were waiting to be called back to a job from
which they had been laid off (BLS 2015). People who were not part of the active workforce,
such as retirees, were not counted. Because calculations of unemployment rates are fairly
consistent across sources, I was able to compare my calculated national unemployment rates with
those reported by other official sources and verify their consistency as a measure of external
validity.
I calculated home ownership rates by dividing the number of people who owned their
home over the total number of possible homeowners (people who were eligible to receive the
census question of whether they owned their dwelling), in the national population and in each
cultural group. Finally, I calculated access to electricity by dividing the number of households
with electricity over the total number of households, in the national population and in each
cultural group. To get the final indicators used in the analyses, I took the absolute value of each
cultural group’s difference from the national average for each indicator in each year. These
variables were included in the final dataset as the measures of economic horizontal inequality.
As noted, in this analysis, I operationalize social and economic horizontal inequality
indicators as the absolute value of the difference between a given group’s average and the
national average. While there are several ways to operationalize horizontal inequality indicators,
I chose this one for several reasons. The difference between a given group’s average and the
national average provides an indication as to whether or not the group is relatively better- or
worse-off than the “average” person within their society. Because other groups are necessarily
included in the national average, this operationalization allows me to gauge if the group of
interest is generally better- or worse-off than most people in the society.
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I took the absolute value of the difference between a group’s average and the national
average, as opposed to simply the difference, because of the hypotheses I seek to test. I am
testing the hypothesis that the presence of inequality itself is correlated with conflict (H1, as
discussed in section 3.2.1). I am also testing the hypothesis that the most unequal groups in a
society are the most likely to engage in violence (H3, as discussed in section 3.2.1). This is not to
suggest that being better- or worse-off does not have an effect on conflict and how it develops;
rather, it is to test the notion that the presence of inequality itself is correlated with these
outcomes. I seek to refrain from “immunizing” my analysis to null findings by testing several
manifestations of inequality that could possibly be correlated with conflict and conflict
dynamics. Instead, in this study, I test only what I explicitly hypothesize is correlated with
conflict, that greater inequality is correlated with an increase in the likelihood of 1) conflict
occurrence and 2) group involvement. I use underutilized measures of inequality and readilyavailable data to do so. The purpose of this exercise is to assess the viability of these measures
and methods to study conflict and its dynamics, and to compare differences in effects of different
indicators. Future researchers might expand upon these hypotheses and include additional
qualities about the groups studied, such as whether a given group is better- or worse-off than the
average person, and not just different22. Different operationalizations would be useful in future
research, since there are still ongoing discussions (e.g., Stewart et al. 2010) regarding which
indicators of horizontal inequality are best to include in analyses, and how to operationalize these
concepts in ways that depict a fuller picture of how inequality manifests in different societies. As
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I have conducted preliminary analyses on this front, examining the relationship between my independent variables
without absolute values and the outcomes of interest (see Tables 12 and 13 in Appendix C). These analyses provide
evidence for the idea that future research is warranted and are discussed further in Chapter 5 (“Research
Implications”).
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the field continues to develop, it is worth testing different ways of getting at relative inequality in
analyses and noting any differences in effect.
Using the census samples to calculate horizontal inequality indicators in this way allowed
me to include several indicators of social and economic horizontal inequality. Including such
indicators provides a more comprehensive picture of how inequality manifests within each
society. Including them also makes it possible to compare differences in effect between these
various manifestations of inequality, and assess whether it is worthwhile for researchers to
pursue incorporating different indicators of inequality into their analyses of conflict. Finally, it
allows me to better assess horizontal inequality’s relationships with both conflict and group
involvement in conflict.
Notably, in societies where there is wide variation on group size, the largest group will
contribute most to overall national averages, and would therefore have a relatively small
deviation from the national average. This would mean that, even if the largest group fared
considerably better than other groups, it would be close to “average.” However, I test the theory
that a group’s relative inequality – how they fare socially, economically, and politically as
compared to most people in their country – is correlated with conflict occurrence and group
involvement in conflict. If a given group is the largest group in a society by a large margin, its
social and economic indicators will be reflective of most people in that society. Likewise, even if
a group is small, its average difference from the “average” person is able to be noted with this
measure. Therefore, the use of distance from the national average to gauge inequality between
groups is an appropriate measure, particularly for initial analyses.
It also should be noted that, while these types of indicators have been used outside of the
conflict literature to indicate the societal well-being of nations and peoples, there is room for
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critique on these measures. Specifically, inter-group differences on inequality measures do not
always necessarily indicate unequal access to societal benefits. For example, while differences in
home ownership could be the result of systematic unequal access to wealth and home-owning
resources such as loans, it could also be the result of differences in how groups prioritize home
ownership. One group could, for example, be settled and systematically desire home ownership
at larger rates, while another group could be nomadic and see home ownership as a low priority.
While this critique is reasonable, reports and studies of each of the countries within this
study’s sample23 indicate that differential access (not simply differential priorities) across group
lines is present in each country (e.g., Baker 2001; Bennett et al. 2008; Bleckner 2015; MRGI
2018). These reports feature concrete illustrations of where and how systematic inequalities have
led to group disparities, which indicate that the inequalities measured in this study are indeed
reflections of unequal access, not simply different group attributes. For example, Bleckner
(2015) recounts the government-mandated forced evictions, displacement, and torture of
indigenous ethnic minorities in Bangladesh. In this case, the minorities were displaced in part so
the country’s ethnically most advantaged group, supported by the government, could settle in an
area called the Chittagong Hills (Bleckner 2015). Unequal housing stability in this case is clearly
the result of systematically unequal circumstances, not of differences in group characteristics
such as being nomadic versus being settled. This example of systematic discrimination in
Bangladesh is emblematic of circumstances in the other countries in the sample. It provides
reason to believe that measures of inequality in this study are reflective of unequal access.
However, to the critique’s point, differences across the social and economic inequality
measures in this study still might not wholly reflect inequality on the ground in these countries.
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See Chapter 3.3, “The Sample,” for a full description of the sample.
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Likewise, in some other societies, certain measures might not be reflective of differential access,
but rather differences in group attributes. With this critique in mind, it is still important to note
the argument that, particularly in societies with demonstrated cleavages across group lines, group
differences in social and economic indicators could reflect the ways in which inequality presents
itself in the society.
As a final note, some of the literature (e.g., Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Stewart
2008; Cramer 2003) notes the relevance of perceived as well as objective inequalities. It would
therefore be useful to include a measure of perceived inequality across societies, but data is
currently still a major barrier (see Chapter 3.5, “Methodological Limitations,” for a fuller
discussion). To ensure data quality and maintain a focused scope, I measure objective
inequalities and study their relationship with conflict. In many cases, it is reasonable to expect
these will coincide with perceived inequalities; however, this should not always be assumed to
be the case, as the two can differ substantially (Miodownik and Nir 2016; Langer and Smedts
2013). Likewise, though the omission of perceived inequalities could make the effect of
objective inequalities appear larger than they are, this potential for bias is unlikely to negate
findings (see Chapter 3.5, “Methodological Limitations,” for a fuller discussion). I hypothesize
that perceived inequalities, as well as the way they are framed, are relevant to conflict
developments. However, I limit the scope of my study to assessing the relationship between
objective inequalities, which I measure in the ways described above, and violent conflict
dynamics.
3.2.3 Independent Variables – Controls
Horizontal inequality does not operate in a vacuum. Other factors can increase or
decrease the risk of conflict, even in the face of horizontal inequality. Since I am only examining
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the relationship between horizontal inequality and violent conflict, not every predictor of conflict
should be accounted for. However, those that are likely to (moderately) correlate with horizontal
inequality, violent conflict, and group involvement should be included in the analysis to mitigate
omitted variable bias and better partial out the effect of horizontal inequality on violent conflict
and group involvement.
One control variable is respective group size. Group size denotes each cultural group’s
share in the total population of the country. It is measured as a value ranging between 0 and 1,
where 1 means that a group makes up 100% of the country. Including it is useful for
understanding whether the detected effect of horizontal inequality is the result of group
inequalities in and of themselves, or whether it is group size that actually drives response to
horizontal inequality. Group size is publicly available data, compiled in the EPR Core dataset
(Vogt et al. 2015).
Another important control is government repression. Government repression is a measure
of how many civil liberties a government provides its people in a given country (e.g., access to
peaceful protest; legal protections for investigative and journalistic entities; etc.). This variable is
measured annually by Freedom House, who uses an extensive survey to determine each
country’s level of civil liberties and political rights. The survey measures factors related to
freedom and government extraction, such as whether independent groups can count votes, rule of
law, etc. (Puddington et al. 2017). Each answer generates a score, and the average score
determines whether Freedom House ultimately categorizes the country as “free,” “partly free,” or
“not free.” Civil liberties are scored on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means that a country
enforces no systematic repression of civil rights and 7 means that a country enforces grave
systematic repression of civil rights.
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Government repression is important to include, because if a country’s rule of law and
level of repression is incredibly high generally, it could negate the capacity to organize and form
armed groups. As discussed in the literature review, this phenomenon has been evidenced in
works such as those of Muller (1985), who finds repressive regimes to alter the effect of income
inequality, and Gurr (1993), who finds repression to modify effects of marginalization. Likewise,
literature on horizontal inequality and conflict has mentioned the need to include variables that
get at military capacity (Mancini 2008). As such, including the measure of repression, which was
used in Muller (1985), is an important step to parsing out the effects of horizontal inequalities.
I also included a trend variable as a control. This allowed me to determine if conflicts are
simply becoming more intense or entrenched as a function of time (that is, conflicts get worse as
they go on), or if it is as a result of changing horizontal inequality levels over time. Including this
variable allowed me to distinguish the effects of horizontal inequality and any trend intrinsic to
conflict onset or group involvement.
Finally, I included logged GDP and a variable called “neighbor” as controls. Logged
GDP is included because economic development is a common indicator for conflict, and is often
included in studies on the topic (Ostby 2008; Cederman et al. 2013). It is collected and
disseminated by the World Bank data bank (World Bank 2020). “Neighbor” is a measure of how
many bordering countries are also in conflict in a given year. It is included to capture the effect
of spillover on a given country’s conflict development.
3.3. The Sample
This study includes data from 28 cultural groups scattered across 8 countries, with data
ranging from 1971-2011, for a span of 40 years. Each group, country, and year of census data
included in the sample can be found listed in alphabetical order in Appendix A. The number of
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cultural groups in each country ranges from 2 to 7, with the mean being 3.5 and the median being
3. Given that each group appears in each census year, the total sample size is 70.
Census years for each country are different (for instance, Bangladesh conducts a census
in 1991 while Colombia does in 1993), and countries begin conducting censuses at different
points in time (for instance, Indonesia’s first available census is collected in 1971, where Mali’s
is 1987). As noted, Appendix A lists each of the census years for each of the countries. Each
country collects two or three censuses, with the exception of Indonesia, which collects four
censuses, as its censuses begin earliest. The mean amount of censuses conducted per country is
2.6 (median, 2.5).
Each country’s relevant groups, as identified by a survey of regional experts (see Vogt et
al. 2015), are the units of analysis. As noted, I calculated horizontal inequality measures for each
group by calculating average rates (e.g., average child mortality rates, etc.) amongst groups. In
most of the sample’s cases, the census explicitly collected demographic information assigning
individuals to the relevant ethnic groups identified in the EPR Core dataset. However, in the case
of Indonesia, ethnicity information was not collected for most of the censuses. I instead use
religious groupings, which are demonstrated by MRGI (2018), Ananta et al. (2015), Stewart et
al. (2010), and Mancini (2008) to follow ethnic lines and serve as a reliable proxy in Indonesia.
Likewise, in Mali and Peru, linguistic groupings are collected rather than explicit ethnic
groupings. These are also demonstrated by Stewart et al. (2010) to serve as a reliable proxy of
ethnicity in these contexts. It should also be noted that in Nepal, relevant cultural groups are
identified as six castes, which are made up of various ethnic subgroups (ex., the Hill Brahman
and Hill Chhetri ethnic groups are part of the larger caste, Caste Hill Hindu Elite). The Nepalese
census conducted the census using these ethnic subgroups as categories, which I recoded back
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into their larger caste categorizations by using Bennett et al.’s (2008) and Shreshta’s (2002)
guidelines for grouping. As an added measure to ensure external validity and confirm groupings
from all of these countries matched up with demographic breakdowns in EPR Core and official
records, I compared the percentage of the population that was in a given group in my dataset
with the officially-recorded percentage of the population in that group. That is, for each of these
countries, I ensured that my calculated ethnic breakdowns matched those in the EPR Core
dataset and recorded by official records. In each case, the groupings matched. This step helps
ensure that the group averages I calculated are reliable.
Within this sample, conflict occurs fairly often from year-to-year. In census years,
Bangladesh experiences conflict in one of its three census years. Guatemala experiences conflict
in two of its three census years, and Indonesia does in two of its four census years. Mali
experiences conflict in one of its three census years. Colombia, Peru, and Uganda experience
conflict in both of their census years. Additional information on the likelihood of conflict can be
found in Chapter 4, “Results.”
The field-wide limitations surrounding inequality data make it necessary to consider
whether countries in the sample systematically differ from countries outside the sample. Some
countries, such as Rwanda and Nigeria, do not ask people to identify with or allow for data
collection on ethnicity, due to ethnicity’s connections to historic violence (Canelas and
Gisselquist 2018; Okolo 1999). Likewise, the particular countries included in this sample are
included because they allowed people to identify with culturally- and politically-relevant groups
in the given years. However, this difference does not necessarily mean that in-sample and out-ofsample countries have systematically different kinds of inequality.
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Indeed, there is reason to believe that this issue does not negatively affect the sample.
The census data was originally collected with the intention of capturing different aspects of life
in the countries of interest: demographic breakdowns, maternal and child health, overall level of
education, etc. (UNSD 2017). It was not specifically collected to provide a way to calculate
horizontal inequality measures. Therefore, as Ostby (2008) argues, it is less likely that these
kinds of data would have been hidden systematically by some countries for the purpose of
improving horizontal inequality measures, and systematically presented by countries with more
equal measures. This is not to imply that demographic breakdowns could not have factored into a
country’s choice of which data to collect or not collect; rather, it is to say that the issue is likely
to be less severe with these data. There is, therefore, a logical basis for the idea that differences
in inequality levels between in- and out-of-sample countries could be random. This is
consequential, because non-random differences would make findings clearly less generalizable.
However, there still could be an issue of sample bias, in which correlates estimated in this
analysis underestimate the worldwide relationships between horizontal inequality, conflict
occurrence, and group involvement. This is because countries with any data at all could differ
systematically from countries that do not have data, most notably in terms of their conflict types.
Every country in the sample is a country in conflict. However, it is possible that countries
excluded from IPUMS’ data altogether, such as Central African Republic (CAR), are excluded
due to particularly low governmental capacity or intense conflicts at times of what would have
been census conduction or data collection. If this is true, it could suggest that findings are only
generalizable to countries stable enough to allow adequate record-keeping of large geographical
areas. That bias would underestimate the general relationship between horizontal inequality and
conflict. If ethnic or religious conflicts, such as that of CAR’s, for example, are excluded from
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the sample because they are so intense or have had a systematically different effect, the general
relationship between grouped inequalities and conflict could appear less dramatic than it is. Still,
there is the question of how severe this issue is likely to be. The vast majority of countries
conduct censuses, including countries in conflict (UNSD 2017). Therefore, while I cannot rule
out the possibility of sample bias, findings would still be applicable to countries with some form
of record-keeping capabilities, which is the overwhelming majority of them.
3.4 Model Specifications
Because of the preliminary nature of exploring the relationships of interest (either in and
of themselves or with these variables specifically), it is most appropriate to test the relationships
using several model specifications. Doing so makes it possible to assess the robustness of the
parameter estimates against different specifications.
It should be noted that the models used to conduct this exercise provide preliminary
examples of the analyses that can be done with this data. There are a number of adaptations and
changes to these analyses researchers should consider in future studies, which are discussed more
at length in Chapter 5 (“Research Implications”). For the purposes of this dissertation, it is
simply useful to note if, when these operationalizations of horizontal inequality are incorporated
into an analysis, there are correlations between each of the indicators and 1) conflict occurrence
and 2) group involvement in conflict. The small sample size available from the census data
employed inflates standard errors, but it provides considerable evidence if correlations are
detected. While these preliminary analyses provide a useful glance into possible correlations,
there is still room for further analysis to more definitively determine and compare effects,
particularly since this analysis features several drawbacks (see sections 3.5 “Methodological
Limitations” and 5.1 “Results Summarization” for a fuller discussion). Still, this (albeit limited)
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treatment helps assess if examining variables in these ways (i.e., with the present indicators,
operationalizations, dependent variables, and data) is a worthwhile exercise.
Before conducting analyses, I explore trends in the dependent variables themselves.
Then, to examine correlations between horizontal inequality and conflict, I graphically depict
bivariate relationships between horizontal inequality indicators and the predicted probability of
conflict. I then conduct a simple linear probability model and logit model (see Chapter 4,
“Results”). I run this analysis with group-level and country-level indicators, noting results in the
adjoining discussion. These tests, while quite simple, allow me to take note of patterns between
the variables using these data.
Because of its within-group variance, I am able to subject the relationship between
horizontal inequality and group involvement to stricter tests, such as the random effects linear
probability model (see Chapter 4, “Results,” for a fuller explanation). The data is paneled, and
“unobservables” (e.g., historical events, cultural contexts, etc.) might mean that countries have
differences in their original underlying propensities to engage in conflict. Allowing Beta
coefficients to vary and implementing a random effects24 linear probability model would help
account for this. However, this analysis assumes that there is variation on the dependent variable
within country-years. This assumption cannot be met when conflict is the dependent variable of
interest, because if a country is in conflict in a given year, every cultural group in that country
will receive a 1 for that year. Likewise, if a country is not in conflict in a given year, every
cultural group will receive a 0 for that year. Therefore, there is no variation on the dependent
variable. This is not the case when the dependent variable is group involvement in conflict, as
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A fixed effects analysis would also account for some of these factors; however, because there is a population
beyond the sample about which I am interested in generalizing, the “group” effect can be thought of as random
(Taylor 2019). To ensure this theoretical preference for random effects is appropriate, I estimated random and fixed
effects models and ran a Wu-Hausman test, which confirmed the suitability of the random effects analysis.
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some cultural groups can receive a 1 in years where other cultural groups in the same country
receive a 0. When group involvement is the dependent variable, there is over-time withincountry variation, which allows for a more appropriate use of the random effects analysis.
To study the relationship between horizontal inequality and group involvement, I first
graphically depict bivariate relationships between horizontal inequality indicators and the
predicted probability of group involvement. I then conduct a series of tests of the relationship,
building the models from the simplest test (the linear probability model) to the strictest (the
random effects linear probability model). Each of these models is specified in various ways, to
assess how stable parameter estimates are against these different specifications. While a fuller
exploration of each specification and its detected effects are found in Chapter 4 (“Results”), the
random effects linear probability model can be written as
𝑝̂ (𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑥) = 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑣
̂ 𝑖𝑡 =
𝛽̂0 + 𝛽̂1 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑝𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽̂2 𝑎𝑏𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽̂3 𝑎𝑏𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽̂4 𝑎𝑏𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽̂5 𝑎𝑏𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽̂6 𝑎𝑏𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽̂7 𝑎𝑏𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽̂8 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽̂9 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽̂10 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽̂11 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽̂12 _𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖
+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡

where groupinv is group involvement, polpwr is political inequality, abshicm is group difference
in child mortality, abshilit is group difference in literacy, abshiuni is group difference in
educational attainment, abshiunemp is group difference in unemployment, abshielec is group
difference in electricity, abshiown is group difference in home ownership, cl is government
repression of civil liberties, loggdp is logged GDP, neighbor is the number of bordering
countries at war, size is group size, _t is a time trend, and a and v are composite error terms25.
Specifying the models in various ways, building up to this one, allows me to examine the
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The term a represents time-invariant variables not included in the model, and the term v is allowed to differ
between time periods and cases (Williams 2015).
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robustness of estimates, particularly given the low sample size, and facilitates detecting patterns
in the potential relationship between horizontal inequality and group involvement.
There are several model-building considerations that should be noted with regards to this
exercise. The first is the presence of multicollinearity between some of the inequality indicators’
correlation coefficients. Some forms of horizontal inequality are correlated with others. To
examine multicollinearity, I gathered correlation coefficients for each of the independent and
control variables (see Figure 8 in Appendix B). Many of these variables were not notably
correlated; however, some were. Of the key independent variables (the horizontal inequality
measures), three were moderately correlated (two in the 0.4s, and one in the 0.5s – see Figure 9
in Appendix B). As inequalities are difficult to disentangle and are likely related,
multicollinearity is an issue within this analysis. It inflates standard errors and negatively impacts
estimate consistency. However, this condition also means that, if there is a detected correlation
between independent and dependent variables (particularly given the sample size), there would
be considerably strong evidence against the null.
It is also important to consider the sample’s balance. This analysis features panel data. As
noted earlier in this chapter, observations within the data occur at slightly different frequencies
and in different years due to the variable timing of census collection. One country, for example,
might have conducted a census in 2001, whereas another one did so in 2002. However, this
should not have negative implications for the analysis. Unbalanced panels are an issue when one
unit occurs more or less in the sample for a reason related to data attributes, such as attrition due
to changing horizontal inequality levels or changing conflict qualities. It does not appear this
issue occurs in the sample, though, as no country “drops out” of the sample at any point: their
census years are simply different, for reasons unrelated to the kind of inequality present in each
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country. Likewise, though IPUMS harmonizes and distributes data from each country at different
start times (for example, Indonesia’s first census year in the IPUMS database is 1971, whereas it
is 1987 for Mali), each country has collected censuses previous to their first recorded ones in the
IPUMS database. Thus, every country collects censuses in similar time periods; no country is
systematically different enough to have poor record-keeping that might occur, for example, as
the result of a particularly dangerous conflict. This suggests that the sample, therefore, might not
be systematically “unbalanced” in a way that would bias results. Finally, to protect against the
possibility that unequal time intervals impact parameter estimates, I include two specifications of
a trend variable (see Chapter 4, “Results,” for further explanation). This allows for a better
understanding of the robustness of parameter estimates and helps mitigate the potential
consequences of unequal time intervals.
3.5 Methodological Limitations
It is important to consider the methodological limitations of this study. One limitation is
the imperfect measure of horizontal inequality. In this study, I attempt to implement more
comprehensive measures of horizontal inequality than have been implemented in many previous
cross-country analyses. While the data I use to do so are reliable (Minnesota Population Center
2019a), the inequality indicators I use in this study are still not optimal measures of horizontal
inequality in each society. Three indicators of social or economic inequality does not perfectly
reflect the nature of inequality present within a society. While I intend for the indicators to serve
as reliable proxies for horizontal inequality, societal differences in group statuses or treatment
are not fully captured by the six indicators of social and economic inequality. Therefore, the
measures could fail to pick up on the extent of group differences. Unfortunately, the data
limitations are persistent, and unavailable data cannot be rendered available.
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Another clear limitation is sample size, which decreases statistical power and increases
the likelihood of type II error. As has been discussed extensively, data limitations within the field
are acute, and this has a material impact on sample size. In part, using group-level indicators
helps expand the sample size to N=70; though, this is still fairly small. A low sample size means
that, while I can be sure that the relationships I examine are reflective of what occurred in the
observation years, I cannot be sure that these relationships do not differ by chance from
unobserved years, or that they are generalizable (see Chapter 4, “Results,” for a further
discussion). It does mean, however, that there is considerable evidence for detected correlations,
which must be apparent in the face of inflated standard errors and low statistical power.
Another methodological limitation of the study is omitted variable bias. Some of the
literature (e.g., Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Stewart 2008; Cramer 2003) notes the
relevance of perceived as well as “real” inequalities. It would be useful to include a measure of
perceived inequality across societies, but data is currently still a major barrier to an adequate
study of this. Perceived inequality is likely to positively correlate with real inequality and with
conflict, resulting in an upward bias of the effect of the key independent variables in this study. I
hypothesize that perceived inequalities, as well as the ways they are framed, are informative to
conflict. However, due to limitations in measuring perceived inequality in these contexts, this
study focuses on the relationship between objective inequalities and violent conflict.
Despite the fact that this upward bias exists, it is likely not severe enough to negate
results. That is, the detected effects of objective horizontal inequality in this study are not likely
solely attributable to what are, in fact, the effects of perceived inequality. Miodownik and Nir
(2016) provide the first empirical analysis of the effects of objective and perceived horizontal
inequality on protest behavior and receptivity to violence. The authors find both objective and
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perceived horizontal inequalities to have a statistically significant positive effect on rebellion and
receptivity to violence, supporting the idea that omitting perceived inequalities leads to upwardly
biased estimations of objective inequalities.
However, Miodownik and Nir (2016) also find that objective inequalities have a larger
substantive effect than perceived inequalities, and that this effect is robust, even when objective
and perceived horizontal inequalities are included in the same model. These findings indicate
two things. The first is that perceived and objective inequalities do not account for all of the
same variance, which in turn means that objective inequalities have a unique effect on violence.
Second, the larger substantive effect of objective horizontal inequalities indicates that, even
when perceived inequality is omitted, most of the detected effect of objective inequality is its
actual effect. Miodownik and Nir’s (2016) findings are important, because they indicate that,
despite the presence of an upward bias, the objective inequalities I examine in this analysis have
a distinct effect on conflict, and their detected effects should be considered, at least in large part,
as such.
Endogeneity is a methodological limitation, as well. I theorize that horizontal inequality
is a cause of violent conflict, and that changes in horizontal inequalities could alter aspects of
these conflicts. However, the reverse could be simultaneously true: violent conflict could lead to
horizontal inequality. Simultaneity is likely a present issue with these data. Particularly in
contexts where absolute loss is the same in warring groups, but one group has more people or
resources, horizontal inequality could change as a result of violence. However, rather than
asserting causality, I am exploring correlations and empirical regularities. These regularities can
still be noted, even in the face of endogeneity.
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While the purpose of a purely correlational analysis such as this one is not to resolve the
issue of endogeneity, it is worthwhile to note that authors of previous studies have taken steps to
examine and limit it. Cederman et al.’s (2011) analysis, for example, bolsters the idea of
exogeneity in some conflicts (namely, in conflicts like those in this study, where both sides are
armed, rather than instances of one-sided violence). In their study of horizontal inequality and
conflict onset, Cederman et al. (2011) conduct several supplementary analyses to limit
endogeneity between political and economic horizontal inequality and conflict onset. First, they
drop all group years after an initial conflict begins, disallowing for the statistical possibility of
conflict changing horizontal inequality. They also conduct a static model based on the country’s
first year in the dataset. In all supplementary analyses, the effects of horizontal inequality on
conflict are robust (Cederman et al. 2011). This evidence reinforces the idea that horizontal
inequality can cause conflict, and that findings are not simply estimates of how conflict impacts
horizontal inequality. Still, despite these findings, endogeneity is a worthwhile concern, and
impedes claims of causality.
When considering the possibility of simultaneity, it is also worth considering to what
extent the kind of conflict studied in this analysis (and in studies such as Ostby’s [2008],
Mancini’s [2008], Cederman et al.’s [2011], etc.) causes horizontal inequality theoretically. Mass
violence is most likely to disproportionately affect one group if the conflict 1) is largely onesided or 2) occurs exclusively on the territory of one group (which is also most likely in
instances of one-sided violence, such as in the case of the Darfur genocide). However, as Raleigh
et al. (2010), creators of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), note,
locations of fighting often extend to various regions of a country. They suggest that
geographically-localized prolonged conflicts are not the norm. Likewise, one-sided violence,
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where an armed group targets exclusively unarmed civilian populations (Eck et al. 2016) and
which demonstrably begets horizontal inequality (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008), is a
different concept than the armed conflict of two warring groups (Vogt et al. 2015), as studied in
this analysis and the abovementioned articles in the literature. Both forms of violence can still
cause horizontal inequality; however, the extent to which this occurs likely differs.
As a final limitation, it is important to note that this study is restricted in scope. I do not
attempt to determine a full account of what causes conflict. Rather, I simply attempt to illuminate
what we know about whether horizontal inequality contributes to violent conflict and conflict
development. As such, there are important facets to understanding conflict, such as those covered
in the literature review, that I cannot fully address. I do not address the effect of, for example,
collective framing on conflict.
Despite these limitations, it is worth considering the contributive merits of this piece. My
goal is to help fill several research gaps in the field. Researchers’ current assumptions about the
relationship between horizontal inequality and violent conflict could be misguided, given the
stubborn issues related to studying horizontal inequality discussed at length in Chapter 2.5, “The
Research Gaps.” Data issues, methodological limitations, and theory that is underdeveloped in
some regards have stifled what researchers can confidently assert about the relationship between
horizontal inequality and violent conflict. There are few cross-country analyses that exclusively
rely on existing data or employ more than one indicator of economic and social horizontal
inequality. Likewise, there are very few studies examining horizontal inequality’s effect on
conflict dynamics, such as who engages in conflict. Despite these field-wide limitations, some
authors have discussed the relationship between horizontal inequality and violent conflict as
clearly demonstrated and causative. However, if the understanding of the relationship is
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misguided or incomplete, this could adversely affect policy aimed at rectifying either inequality
or violence.
In this dissertation, I attempt to fill some of these gaps. By exclusively relying on existing
data, expanding measurements of social and economic horizontal inequality, and exploring
possible correlations between horizontal inequality and group involvement, I am able to more
closely examine horizontal inequality’s relationships with the outcomes of interest. By
specifying models in several ways, I am better able to discern the robustness of parameter
estimates. These contributions help inform how we can study horizontal inequality in the future
and what we think about whether and why it affects violent conflict dynamics.
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS
4.1 A Summary of the Results
Ultimately, analyses showed promise of potential relationships between horizontal
inequality and 1) conflict occurrence and 2) group involvement in conflict. However, these
relationships might be more complex than previously postulated. While definitive conclusions
cannot be drawn from the exploratory analyses conducted here, such analyses suggest that
further investigation into the relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics
(most notably, beyond simply whether conflict initially occurs) is warranted. It will be
particularly useful to pursue additional data for these investigations, which can help elucidate
potential complexities in the relationships that remain muddied.
Findings pointed to several horizontal inequality indicators that seemed to have a notable
relationship with the dependent variables of interest, and supported the notion that further study
would be useful. In particular, grouped inequality vis-à-vis educational attainment, access to
electricity, unemployment, and home ownership seemed to have relationships with conflict
dynamics. Some indicators were positively correlated with the outcomes, which was consistent
with hypotheses. Others, however, appeared to have an inverse correlation with outcome
variables, challenging our current understanding of how horizontal inequality relates to conflict
dynamics. Possible explanations for these detected effects are explored in Chapter 5 (“Research
Implications”).
There were also several control variables with notable relationships with conflict
occurrence and group involvement. Consistent with the literature (see Chapter 2.3.2
“Governmental Structure”), groups appear less likely to become involved in conflicts as the
government moves from moderate to extreme repression, likely because extreme repression
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prevents large-scale mobilization (Muller 1985; Gurr 1993). They are also less likely to become
involved in conflicts as logged GDP increases, likely because a more well-off society is
associated with better development outcomes and less desire to rebel (Ostby 2008).
Corroborating previous studies (Mancini 2008; Ostby 2008; Tiwari 2010; Cederman et al.
2013), horizontal inequality seems to have a relationship with conflict. However, the current
analysis also provides new evidence that this relationship might be more complex than
previously thought. Likewise, it provides evidence that horizontal inequality might affect conflict
dynamics, such as which groups are involved in the conflict. Whether violent conflict and group
involvement are more, less, or just as likely seems to depend upon the specific type of horizontal
inequality present in a society (e.g., whether it is unequal in terms of access to electricity, for
example, versus in terms of home ownership). These findings, if substantiated in future analyses,
would have notable theoretical, policy, and research implications, discussed in Chapter 5
(“Research Implications”).
When taking these results into consideration, it is again important to keep in mind the
preliminary nature of these analyses. The purpose of these models is to establish a preliminary
assessment of the relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics using the
variables created for this analysis and the strategies implemented to help isolate the relationships.
There are several limitations to the analyses that should be kept in mind (see section 5.1,
“Results Summarization”).
Arguably the most notable takeaway from the analyses is that further investigation into
the relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics using these kinds of data
and indicators is warranted. As it appears from these results, there might be differential effects
on conflict dynamics depending upon the way horizontal inequality manifests within a society.
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This notion is worth continued exploration. Similarly, results provide support for the idea that it
is worthwhile to continue down the path of 1) identifying better data and data sources, 2) taking
into consideration additional aspects of the way inequality manifests within a society (e.g.,
indicating which groups are better- or worse-off, incorporating various indicators of social and
economic inequality, etc.), and 3) examining horizontal inequality’s effect on not only conflict
onset, but also its various dynamics.
While the analyses presented in the current study are preliminary, they reinforce the idea
that accessing various kinds of data, incorporating various indicators into cross-country analyses,
and examining the effect of these indicators on additional dependent variables are useful
strategies for future research. These strategies could provide further insight into the relationship
between horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics.
4.2 Key Independent Variables
The key independent variables included in this study are measures of horizontal
inequality. Specifically, they are group distances from the national average in terms of a group’s
child mortality rates, literacy rates, educational attainment, unemployment rates, access to
electricity, and home ownership rates. They also include a categorical variable indicating a given
group’s access to political power, where 1 is a monopoly and 4 is exclusion from any power.
Examined relationships between horizontal inequality and 1) conflict occurrence and 2) group
involvement are delineated below.
4.2.1 Horizontal Inequality and Conflict Occurrence
Before examining the direct relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict, it is
important to understand trends in the variables themselves. To this end, it is worthwhile to
consider several descriptive statistics of these variables.
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Conflict occurs fairly often within the sample countries. As noted in section 3.3, “The
Sample,” conflict occurs in 62.8% of the 70 observations in the sample. From 1971-2011, the
likelihood of conflict is roughly 55%. The likelihood of conflict occurring in the sample is higher
than it is from 1971-2011. These differences in means, which describe the proportion of time
countries are in conflict, can be seen in Table 1, below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------Mean
SD
Mean
SD
within Sample
within Sample from 1971-2011 from 1971-2011
(N=70)
(N=70)
(N=1148)
(N=1148)
---------------------------------------------------------------------conflict |
.6285714
.486675
.554007
.4972913
(.0581688)
(.0146771)
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 1: Proportion of Time Countries are in Conflict (1971-2011) (Data source: Petterson et al. 2019; Gleditsch et
al. 2002)

From 1971-2011, trends in conflict varied considerably by country. While in Guatemala,
for example, conflict became less likely over time, it become more likely in Nepal. To obtain
these trends, I calculated the predicted probability of conflict. I regressed conflict on interaction
variables of country-year, which allowed the slopes and intercepts to vary. I then used the results
to predict the probability of y (conflict). Individual country trends in conflict from 1971-2011
can be seen in Figure 2, below, which shows how the predicted probability of conflict changes
over time for each country.
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Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Conflict, 1971-2011 (Data source: Petterson et al. 2019; Gleditsch et al. 2002)

Likewise, trends in conflict can be seen by country in sample years (see Figure 3 below).
I again used the predicted probability of conflict described above to depict these trends.
Differences in trends between sample years and all years (1971-2011) can be noted by
comparing Figures 2 and 3. In sample years, conflict becomes less likely over time, consistent
with observations by several researchers (e.g., Lacina and Gleditsch [2005]), who note that major
international and civil conflicts have declined since the Cold War.

Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Conflict within Sample Years (Data source: Petterson et al. 2019; Gleditsch et al.
2002)
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Regarding the independent variables, means, standard errors, and standard deviations for
each can be found below in Table 2 (N=70 26). It should be kept in mind, when interpreting
results of analyses detailed further in this chapter, that the social and economic horizontal
inequality measures are produced as proportions rather than whole percentages. For example, the
mean of the variable abshicm (the absolute value of a group’s distance from the national average
in terms of its child mortality) is 0.0296461. Because this is a proportion, it should be interpreted
that, on average, groups had a difference of roughly 3% from the national average.

--------------------------------------------------------|
Mean
Standard Deviation
-------------+------------------------------------------abshicm |
.0296461
.0568332
(.0067929)
abshilit |
.0736306
.0574125
(.0072224)
abshiuni |
.010357
.0126052
(.0015066)
abshiunemp |
.0057659
.0092777
(.0011089)
abshielec |
.0955242
.1236374
(.0147775)
abshiown |
.0409507
.0535346
(.0063986)
polpwr |
3.228571
.9656631
(.1154188)
size |

24.98843
27.93895
(3.339343)
gini |
40.69104
7.771017
(.9493808)
gdp |
64.47829
152.7173
(18.25321)
loggdp |
2.891383
1.498627
(.1791202)
cl |
4.295775
1.005618
(.1193449)
neighbor |
1.3228571
1.228571
(.0890981)
-------------------------------------------------------

Table 2: Means of Independent Variables (Data source: aggregated sources – see section 3.227)

It should also be noted that sufficient variation on the independent variables is necessary
to be able to detect an effect, if it exists. The ratio of the standard deviation to the mean on each
26

The GINI coefficient has 67 observations, as there was not a GINI coefficient calculated for Bangladesh in 2011.
The GINI coefficient is not a variable in any main analysis, and is only used for a sensitivity analysis (see section
4.3).
27 As discussed in section 3.2 (“Variables and Data Sources”), I created or used existing independent variables from
various data sources, including census data from IPUMS (Minnesota Population Center 2019; Boyle et al. 2019), the
EPR Core dataset (Vogt et al. 2015), the World Bank (2020), and Freedom House (Puddington et al. 2017).

78

independent variable is generally greater than one and, in some cases, greater than two. These
ratios indicate sufficient variation.
To examine the relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict occurrence, I
initially estimated a random effects linear probability model of conflict occurrence on horizontal
inequality. This allowed me to take into account the paneled nature of the data. It also allowed
Beta coefficients to vary, which could be consequential if unobservables, such as historical
events or cultural contexts, might change the propensity for conflict. Because panel groups in
this sample would constitute part of a larger population, as Taylor (2019) discusses, their effects
can be thought of as random.
However, when estimating random effects models, there is an assumption of within- and
between-group variance, so that the estimated intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) does not
equal zero. When conflict (a country-level variable) is the dependent variable, every group from
one country has the same value for conflict coded in the same year. That is, in Bangladesh in
1991, for example, all three groups have a 1 coded to indicate that conflict happened that year.
Because of this, there is not sufficient variation to estimate an ICC. Using country-level
measures (e.g., average group differences in Bangladesh in 1991) might introduce more variance,
but doing so reduces the sample size to 21, which is insufficient for a random effects analysis.
Therefore, a different analysis examining the relationship between horizontal inequality and
conflict is appropriate.

“Aggregated sources” refers to these sources for independent variables, and UPCD (Petterson et al. 2019; Gleditsch
et al. 2002) for dependent variables. More information can be found on variables and their sources in section 3.2.
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First, to visualize the relationships between the social and economic horizontal inequality
measures28 and conflict, I depict each measure in a scatter plot alongside the predicted
probability of conflict. This can be seen in Figure 4 below:

Figure 4: Relationship between Group Distance from Nat'l Avg. and Predicted Probability of Conflict (Data source:
aggregated sources – see section 3.2)

The above graphs illustrate the relationship between each group-level measure and
conflict, providing a picture of how group-level heterogeneity (i.e., relevant cultural groups’
distances from the national average) correlates with the predicted probability of conflict. The
starkest relationships can be seen in the educational attainment, unemployment, and home
ownership graphs. Group differences in educational attainment appear to have a considerable
inverse relationship with the predicted probability of conflict, while group differences in
unemployment and home ownership appear to have positive relationships with conflict. If these
findings hold, it would mean that as groups move farther from their country’s national average in
terms of unemployment and home ownership, conflict becomes more likely, as hypothesized.

28

Because political horizontal inequality is a categorical variable, it is not appropriate to visualize in a scatter plot in
the same way.
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However, as groups move farther from their country’s national average in terms of educational
attainment, conflict becomes less likely, which is the opposite of what was hypothesized.
Possible reasons for this relationship are explored in Chapter 5, “Research Implications.”
As noted above, country-level indicators cannot be used for a random effects analysis due
to the insufficient amount of observations; however, they can still help inform researchers about
the relationship between grouped inequality and conflict. In taking the average horizontal
inequality value in each country in each year (e.g., Bangladesh’s average level of grouped
inequality in 1991), I produced country-level indicators that can bolster group-level indicators.
Bivariate depictions of their relationships with the predicted probability of conflict can be found
in Figure 5 below:

Figure 5: Relationship between Average Group Inequality and Predicted Probability of Conflict (Data source:
aggregated sources – see section 3.2)

These relationships mirror those of the group-level indicators, as expected. Estimating the
relationship between the indicators and conflict, though, points to some additional considerations
worth taking into account. Table 3 below depicts the relationship between country-level
horizontal inequality indicators and conflict using two model specifications, a linear probability
model and a logit model.
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------------------------------------------------------conflict |
LPM
Logit
-------------+----------------------------------------m_abscm |
.0523111
-11.2194
(2.850714)
(24.27365)
m_abslit |

-1.814901
(3.704416)

-68.0533
(53.89318)

m_absuni |

-27.1671**
(10.26507)

-309.1977*
(177.9725)

m_abselec |

3.992047**
(1.684154)

71.38793
(46.84442)

m_absunemp |

-30.16842
(18.62365)

-334.5622
(211.4615)

m_absown |

-6.528078*
(3.274087)

-55.7486*
(31.73241)

_cons |

1.081843***

7.95588

-----------------------------------------------------N
21
21
r2
0.4744
-----------------------------------------------------* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 3: Relationship between Country-Level Indicators and Conflict

The model-building process for the linear probability model with country-level indicators
can be found in Table 4, where I add each indicator one-by-one into the model29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------M1
M2
M3
M4
M5
M6
conflict
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------m_abscm
0.141
1.004
-0.264
-1.305
-0.458
0.052
(2.84)
(3.09)
(3.23)
(3.17)
(3.11)
(2.85)
m_abslit
2.651
2.037
-1.845
-2.221
-1.815
(3.52)
(3.51)
(4.19)
(4.05)
(3.70)
m_absuni
-13.091
-16.877
-19.245*
-27.167**
(10.76)
(10.62)
(10.36)
(10.27)
m_abselec
2.871
3.467*
3.992**
(1.84)
(1.82)
(1.68)
m_absunemp
-30.304
-30.168
(20.39)
(18.62)
m_absown
-6.528*
(3.27)
constant
0.615***
0.392
0.632
0.682*
0.808**
1.082***
(0.14)
(0.33)
(0.38)
(0.37)
(0.36)
(0.36 )
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------N
21
21
21
21
21
21
r2
0.000
0.031
0.108
0.226
0.325
0.474
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 4: Model-Building Process for LPM with Country-Level Indicators

29

The mean variance inflation factor (VIF) for this model was 1.47. Individual VIFs ranged from 1.15
(unemployment) to 1.84 (literacy). This supports previous discussions on multicollinearity (see section 3.5), which
suggest a moderate correlation between different kinds of inequality, but not enough to warrant concern, even using
conservative thresholds to identify highly collinear variables (Glen 2015).
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As Table 4 indicates, the effects of (average) group differences in terms of educational
attainment, access to electricity, and home ownership strengthen across specifications as the
other horizontal inequality indicators are added. Regarding access to electricity, the regressions
estimate an increase in the likelihood of conflict as groups move farther from their country’s
national average, on average. As estimated by the linear probability model, the relationship is
significant at the p < 0.05 level (p=0.033), which is notable given the quite low sample size. This
is consistent with the going hypothesis that horizontal inequality positively correlates with
conflict. However, average group distances from the national average in terms of educational
attainment and home ownership are correlated with a lower likelihood of conflict. This
unexpected result runs contrary to H1 (“Political, social, and economic horizontal inequality
increase the likelihood of violent conflict.”).
While not statistically significant, the unemployment indicator’s estimated Beta
coefficient is robust when it is included in Models 5 and 6, remaining roughly -30. This suggests
that the effects of horizontal inequality in terms of unemployment are independent of the effects
of other forms of horizontal inequality. By comparison, the negative effects of educational
attainment on conflict increase (i.e., become more negative) as other horizontal inequality
indicators are included, as indicated in Models 4, 5, and 6. In Model 6, where all social and
economic horizontal inequality indicators are included, the educational attainment parameter is
the smallest it has been throughout the model-building process. This suggests that horizontal
inequality in terms of educational attainment might mitigate conflict in the presence of other
horizontal inequality indicators.
One should be cautious when interpreting the estimated coefficients presented and
discussed above, and throughout the rest of this section. As noted earlier in this section, values
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for social and economic horizontal inequality measures are coded as proportions (e.g., 0.05)
instead of percentages (e.g., 5). Therefore, interpretations of the estimated coefficients for these
measures should be moved to the hundredths place (e.g., where an estimated Beta coefficient of
20 is interpreted as 0.2). To take an example, the estimated effect of the access to electricity
indicator in Table 4 is 3.992. This means that a one-unit change in a country’s average access to
electricity inequality from the mean is estimated to increase the likelihood of conflict from its
base probability of ~0.63 within the sample (see Table 1) by 0.039 to roughly 0.67.
Notably, Figure 4 and Table 3 (above) portray different relationships between some
horizontal inequality measures and conflict. Literacy, unemployment, and home ownership seem
to have positive relationships in Figure 4, which contains bivariate scatterplots depicting
relationships between the social and economic horizontal inequality measures and the predicted
probability of conflict (the continuous specification). In Table 3, which estimates the
relationships between these measures and conflict (the binary specification), the opposite is true.
While one might first assume the signs of these indicators switched as additional indicators were
added into the regression, such is not the case for the unemployment or home ownership
variables 30. When estimating a linear probability or logit model, these indicators appear to have a
negative relationship with conflict, and this is so throughout the model-building process. This
discrepancy is indicative of a lack of robustness and again highlights 1) the potential complexity
of the relationship, 2) the opacity of what horizontal inequality looks like in unobserved years,
and 3) the need to acquire further data to test the relationships of interest with additional, more
comprehensive measures.

30

Literacy, which is never significant in this model and always has an estimated coefficient of around 0, switches
signs as indicators are added (access to electricity, in Model 4 of Table 4).
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I also estimated the effects of group-level horizontal inequality indicators (as opposed to
the country-level indicators in Tables 3 and 4) on conflict. Educational attainment, access to
electricity, and home ownership (the statistically significant indicators from Tables 3 and 4) are
similar in terms of their direction of effects and likewise statistically significant when grouplevel indicators are used to predict conflict in Table 5 (below). Table 5 re-estimates Table 3 with
group-level indicators (M1), with time as a linear variable added (M2), and finally with all
independent variables added (M3). It should be noted that, though the relationship between
political horizontal inequality and conflict was estimated, there were no statistically significant
results in any model, again running contrary to the stated hypothesis.
-------------------------------------------------------------------LPM M1
LPM M2
LPM M3
conflict
-------------------------------------------------------------------abshicm
0.070
-0.000
-0.620
(1.08)
(1.11)
(1.55)
abshilit
0.411
0.416
1.905
(1.12)
(1.12)
(1.33)
abshiuni
-19.129***
-18.417***
-29.774***
(4.63)
(5.29)
(7.54)
abshielec
1.569**
1.543**
1.624**
(0.60)
(0.62)
(0.69)
abshiunemp
-5.270
-5.117
-1.359
(6.91)
(6.98)
(7.17)
abshiown
-2.887**
-2.932**
-3.573**
(1.34)
(1.36)
(1.45)
_t
-0.002
0.003
(0.01)
(0.01)
polpwr=1
0.000
(.)
polpwr=2
0.208
(0.30)
polpwr=3
0.188
(0.28)
polpwr=4
0.326
(0.26)
cl=3
0.000
(.)
cl=4
-0.114
(0.18)
cl=5
0.093
(0.28)
cl=6
-0.068
(0.26)
loggdp
0.061
(0.08)
neighbor
0.219*
(0.12)
size
0.002
(0.00)
constant
0.793***
0.840***
0.008
(0.10)
(0.19)
(0.52)
-------------------------------------------------------------------N
70
70
66
r2
0.245
0.246
0.412
-------------------------------------------------------------------* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 5: Relationship between Group-Level Indicators and Conflict
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The detected relationships fall out of statistical significance when time is incorporated
into the model as a series of dummy variables and all controls are included (see Table 6 below) 31.
Because incorporating sixteen dummy variables uses up degrees of freedom, one might expect
this. However, the variables that were statistically significant in other model specifications
(educational attainment, access to electricity, and home ownership – see Tables 3-5) are still
consistent in terms of their estimated Beta coefficients.
-----------------------------------------LPM, i._t
conflict
-----------------------------------------abshicm
-0.389
(0.60)
abshilit
0.153
(0.49)
abshiuni
-4.407
(3.53)
abshielec
0.328
(0.26)
abshiunemp
-0.240
(3.26)
abshiown
-0.416
(0.70)
_t=1
0.000
(.)
_t=10
1.659***
(0.18)
_t=11
-0.124
(0.32)
_t=17
-1.877***
(0.38)
_t=20
1.515***
(0.19)
_t=21
-0.693*
(0.33)
_t=23
1.119***
(0.18)
_t=24
0.812***
(0.17)
_t=28
-2.492***
(0.43)
_t=31
0.265**
(0.09)
_t=32
0.169
(0.10)
_t=35
0.405
(0.21)
_t=37
_t=39

-0.853**
(0.29)
0.000
(.)
0.000
(.)
0.000
(.)
-0.007
(0.11)
-0.030
(0.11)
0.003
(0.09)

_t=40
_t=41
polpwr=1
polpwr=2
polpwr=3
polpwr=4

31

Specifying time this way allowed only the effects of the years for which census data exists to be estimated, in case
the unequal census intervals affects parameters (see section 4.2.2 for a fuller explanation).
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cl=3

0.000
(.)
cl=4
-1.438***
(0.29)
cl=5
-1.561***
(0.32)
cl=6
-0.800***
(0.16)
loggdp
-0.339***
(0.06)
neighbor
0.283***
(0.06)
size
-0.000
(0.00)
constant
2.361***
(0.44)
--------------------------------------------N
66
r2
0.953
--------------------------------------------* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 6: Conflict and Group-level Indicators with Time as a Series of Dummies

Overall, these preliminary findings provide mixed evidence for hypotheses 1 and 2. They
suggest the relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict is perhaps more complex than
a constant increasing effect of horizontal inequality on the likelihood of conflict. Instead, they
indicate that while horizontal inequality could be correlated with conflict, the kind of horizontal
inequality present in a society might have implications for whether conflict is more or less likely.
I address possible explanations for these findings, as well as their impact on theoretical
orientations, at length in Chapter 5.
4.2.2 Horizontal Inequality and Group Involvement
I also estimated the relationship between horizontal inequality and group involvement in
conflict. The results supported the idea that horizontal inequality could have a considerable effect
not just on whether conflict happens, but also on its dynamics. Results suggested that, even when
held to the strictest test (a random effects linear probability model), horizontal inequality seemed
to have a relationship with group involvement. However, whether a group was more or less
likely to engage depended upon the way in which they were unequal. This suggests that the
relationship between horizontal inequality and group involvement (and, perhaps, other dynamics
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of conflict) is potentially more complex than is currently understood, and further investigation
with improved data is warranted.
There are 28 cultural groups represented in the data. The proportion of groups engaged in
conflict peaks in the 1980s and declines after then. The proportion of groups engaged in conflict,
both from 1971-2011 and exclusively within sample years, can be seen in Figure 6 below.

Figure 6: Proportion of All Groups in Conflict (Data source: Petterson et al. 2019; Gleditsch et al. 2002)

The average percentage of groups involved in conflict from 1971-2011 was roughly 29%,
while the average in sample years was 38.6% (see Table 7).
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Mean
SD
Mean
SD
within Sample within Sample from 1971-2011
from 1971-2011
(N=70)
(N=70)
(N=1148)
(N=1148)
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------groupinv |
.3857143
0.4902782
.2952962
.4563746
(.0585994)
(.0134695)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 7: Percentage of Groups Involved in Conflict (Data source: Petterson et al. 2019; Gleditsch et al. 2002)

Groups varied considerably in the proportion of sample years they engaged in conflict.
Some groups engaged in conflict all the time, others never, and others still, a fraction of the time.
The proportion of time each group was involved in a conflict in sample years differed somewhat
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from the proportion of time they were engaged in conflict from 1971-2011. Illustrations of these
proportions can be see below, in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Proportion of Time Each Group is in Conflict (Data source: Petterson et al. 2019; Gleditsch et al. 2002)

Since there was within-group variation on group involvement, it was appropriate to build
up to a random effects model to estimate the relationship between horizontal inequality and
group involvement. Because of the exploratory nature of using these data to predict group
involvement, I estimated the relationship using different model specifications. Doing so helped
determine how robust the estimated effects were against various specifications.
Bivariate scatterplots of social and economic horizontal inequality measures and the
predicted probability of group involvement can be found in Figure 7 below. Some correlations
can be seen quite plainly in this figure (for example, the notably positive relationship between
unequal access to electricity and the predicted probability of group involvement); however, the
same caveat from the previous section must be kept in mind when interpreting this graph.
Namely, models depicted later in this section estimate the relationship between horizontal
inequality and group involvement in census years, where these bivariate graphs use the predicted
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probability of group involvement over the 41 years from 1971-2011. Because of missing data,
these relationships may not necessarily be reflective of each other, and the need for improved
data is again made clear.

Figure 8: Relationship between Grouped Inequality and Predicted Probability of Group Involvement (Data source:
aggregated sources – see section 3.2)

I estimated the relationships between horizontal inequality and group involvement using
various model specifications, beginning with the simplest and building up in complexity. As can
be seen in Table 8 (below), I first estimate the relationship between solely the social and
economic horizontal inequality indicators and group involvement using simple linear probability
and logit models. Grouped inequality in terms of educational attainment, access to electricity,
and home ownership display statistically significant relationships with group involvement in
conflict, which is notable given the sample size (N=70). According to these initial two models, as
groups move farther from the national average (i.e., more unequal) in terms of their access to
electricity, they are more likely to become involved in conflict. However, as groups move farther
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from the national average in terms of their educational attainment and home ownership, they are
less likely to become involved in conflict.
I then added the trend variable to these regressions using two different specifications.
First, I included time as a linear trend variable, as is standard practice to control for the
possibility that groups become more or less involved in conflict as a function of time. However,
countries conduct their censuses at different time intervals (see Appendix A for a list of years
that each country conducted a census included in this sample). Bangladesh, for example,
conducts its census every ten years, whereas for Colombia, there is a twelve-year gap between
censuses. It is unclear how these unequal time intervals might affect parameter estimates.
Therefore, I also include time as a series of dummy variables for each data year (i.e., year in
which data were available). Years received a 1 if they were a year in which data were available
for that year or a 0 otherwise. This allowed only the effects of data years to be estimated (see
Table 8). In terms of their effect sizes, grouped inequality in educational attainment, access to
electricity, and home ownership remain fairly stable across the model specifications. When time
is linear, the educational attainment indicator falls out of significance, and when time is
dummied, only home ownership maintains statistical significance. This is unsurprising given that
dummying time uses degrees of freedom. It is therefore helpful to take into consideration the
general trend of these variables, recognizing the implication that these potential relationships
warrant further attention.
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------LPM
Logit
LPM + _t
LPM + i._t
groupinv
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------abshicm
abshilit
abshiuni
abshielec
abshiunemp
abshiown

-0.537
(1.15)
0.903
(1.19)
-8.245*
(4.94)
1.526**
(0.65)
-4.390
(7.38)
-3.368**
(1.43)

-1.031
(5.87)
4.762
(5.58)
-41.931*
(25.47)
9.076**
(3.97)
-32.141
(50.20)
-26.059**
(12.14)

_t

-0.669
(1.19)
0.912
(1.20)
-6.913
(5.65)
1.476**
(0.66)
-4.103
(7.45)
-3.454**
(1.45)
-0.003
(0.01)

0.265
(1.08)
0.094
(1.15)
-9.093
(5.61)
0.414
(0.65)
8.453
(7.82)
-2.738*
(1.62)

_t=1

0.000
(.)
_t=10
0.395
(0.35)
_t=11
1.022**
(0.39)
_t=17
-0.042
(0.34)
_t=20
0.381
(0.35)
_t=21
0.396
(0.28)
_t=23
1.044***
(0.34)
_t=24
1.138** *
(0.40)
_t=28
0.307
(0.38)
_t=31
0.617**
(0.30)
_t=32
0.251
(0.28)
_t=35
1.140** *
(0.38)
_t=37
1.281** *
(0.42)
_t=39
0.593*
(0.35)
_t=40
0.009
(0.35)
_t=41
0.159
(0.31)
constant
0.438***
-0.131
0.525**
0.039
(0.11)
(0.51)
(0.20)
(0.27)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------N
70
70
70
70
r2
0.1505
0.1539
0.5637
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 8: Relationship between Horizontal Inequality and Group Involvement without Controls

Table 9 (below) contains model specifications in which all independent variables are
included, again beginning with the simplest specifications and increasing in complexity to the
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strictest test. After estimating a simple linear probability model with all independent variables
included, I specified the model by clustering standard errors by group (referred to as “ID” in
Table 9) and then by country. I find clustering by country to be the most theoretically appropriate
choice, and therefore cluster by country in the random effects models, as well. However, I
included the models clustered by group 1) to be able to examine how this affects standard errors
and 2) because there is still some debate as to which variables to cluster by, especially depending
on the research question.
I used guidance by Abadie et al. (2017), further discussed by McKenzie (2017), in my
decision to make clustering by country the default. According to these authors, if there is a
cohort from a locale (e.g., a village), it is most appropriate to cluster that locale (in this example,
the village). This is because there are likely villages that the researcher is interested in drawing
conclusions about beyond the sample. Likewise, there are not likely cohorts about which the
researcher is interested in drawing conclusions that are excluded from the sample. In the current
analysis, there are not culturally-relevant groups that have been excluded from the analysis, nor
are there culturally-relevant groups outside of the sample about which I am interested in drawing
conclusions. Instead, there are countries in the population beyond my sample, and I am interested
in drawing conclusions about how horizontal inequality relates to conflict dynamics within them.
The fourth model specification in Table 9 is a random effects linear probability model,
clustered by country. I estimated it to account for the panel data and allow Beta coefficients to
vary. Because the panel “group” constitutes a subset of the larger population, the group effect
can be thought of as random, as opposed to fixed (Taylor 2019). However, to ensure that this was
an appropriate theoretical choice, I estimated a fixed effects model, as well, and ran a WuHausman test, which confirmed the random effects model as the more appropriate specification.
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The next four models are the same as the initial four, except time is specified as a series
of dummy variables. This is again to allow for the possibility that the unequal time intervals of
the censuses affect parameter estimates. Including time as a series of dummy variables allows for
fuller comparison. As can be noted in Table 9, dummying the time variable also added sufficient
variation to calculate an ICC on the random effects model. While there is between- and withingroup variation, it is still fairly small.
Of the horizontal inequality indicators, grouped inequality in terms of educational
attainment and home ownership display a statistically significant relationship with group
involvement in conflict when time is linear (column 4 of Table 9, “Random Effects”), and
unemployment displays one when time is dummied (column 8 of Table 9, “Random Effects,
i._t”). Access to electricity is statistically significant in the basic linear probability model and in
the linear probability model clustered by cultural group (columns 1 and 2); though, it is
insignificant in the remainders of the models. By comparison, the unemployment indicator
becomes statistically significant in later models, when standard errors are clustered by country
and time is dummied.
As groups move farther from the national average in their access to electricity and in their
unemployment rates, they become more likely to engage in conflict. While the access to
electricity indicator is only statistically significant in the first two specifications, it is worth
noting, given the limited sample size and minimal degrees of freedom in later specifications.
Because some variables are significant with small sample sizes, it is unclear whether these
effects would remain significant with a larger sample size. I do not, therefore, attempt to argue
that these effects would be statistically significant with additional data. Rather, I am noting that
variables fall in and out of significance with these data, and additional data would help elucidate
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which indicators (if any) seem to have more robust relationships, whether these effects are
independent of other variables, etc. (see Chapter 5 for further discussion). If these relationships
hold, they provide support for H3 (“Groups that experience the most extreme horizontal
inequality are most likely to engage in conflict.”).
Grouped inequality in terms of educational attainment and home ownership appear to
have an inverse relationship with group involvement, and comparably large effect sizes across
specifications. That is, as groups get farther from their national average in terms of their
educational attainment and home ownership rates, they become less likely to engage in conflict.
These results do not support H3. Possible reasons for these relationships, if they exist, are
discussed in Chapter 5, “Research Implications.”
Political horizontal inequality did not have a notable relationship with group
involvement, either in terms of substantive or statistical significance. When time is linear, it is
estimated to have a U-curve; when time is dummied, it is inverse, meaning that more
marginalized groups are less likely to engage in conflict. However, the effect sizes are
considerably small, and it never reaches statistical significance. This is not to suggest that
political horizontal inequality is unimportant to group involvement; however, it is not evidenced
in these specifications with this (limited) data.
Regarding control variables, government repression and logged GDP have relationships
that are consistent with findings in the extant literature. Results indicate a generally decreasing
likelihood of group involvement as governments progress from moderate to extreme measures of
repression. This is consistent with Gurr’s (1993) and Muller’s (1985) findings, discussed in
Chapter 2.3.2 (“Governmental Structure”), which demonstrate that countries with moderate
repression experience conflict at higher rates than those with very severe or very little
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repression 32. Increases in a country’s logged GDP are also associated with a decrease in group
engagement in violence, which indicates that people engage in violent conflict less as their
society’s economy becomes more developed. This is unsurprising given economic
development’s consistent association with conflict (or lack thereof) (Hegre 2002; Ostby 2008;
Cilliers & Schunemann 2013).
Notably, these findings do not evidence group size to have a statistically significant
relationship with group involvement in conflict. Its substantive effect is also quite small. This
runs contradictory to theoretical understandings noted in some other studies (e.g., Ostby 2008;
Stewart et al. 2010), where the authors propose measuring horizontal inequality between the two
largest or most politically competitive groups, as inequality between these groups might be most
likely to cause conflict. The results of the current analysis, however, suggest that, if horizontal
inequality has an effect on group involvement, it is present regardless of group size. This notion
boosts the idea that horizontal inequality itself is informative to whether a country experiences
conflict.

32

As noted previously, this is because governments with very little repression allow for legitimate means of social
change, such as protest or voting, thereby discouraging people from violent means of social change. Likewise,
countries that employ very severe forms of repression limit civil liberties to organize and mobilize, rendering
rebellion infeasible. Moderately repressive regimes offer too few legitimate means to alleviate discontent, but still
allow for enough mobilization to organize. Refer to Chapter 2.3.2 (“Governmental Structure”) for a fuller
discussion.
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------LPM
LPM
LPM
Random
LPM
LPM
LPM
Random
groupinv
cluster(ID)
cluster(ctry)
Effects
i._t
cluster(ID), i._t cluster(ctry), i._t Effects, i._t
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------abshicm
0.052
0.052
0.052
0.052
0.535
0.535
0.535
0.404
(1.64)
(1.87)
(1.96)
(1.96)
(1.78)
(1.38)
(0.95)
(0.86)
abshilit
1.923
1.923
1.923
1.923
-0.356
-0.356
-0.356
-0.208
(1.41)
(1.59)
(1.35)
(1.35)
(1.45)
(1.71)
(1.67)
(1.54)
abshiuni
-9.078
-9.078
-9.078*
-9.078**
-2.605
-2.605
-2.605
-3.129
(7.98)
(7.97)
(4.15)
(4.15)
(10.41)
(6.77)
(4.75)
(4.46)
abshielec
1.289*
1.289*
1.289
1.289
0.096
0.096
0.096
0.065
(0.73)
(0.65)
(0.85)
(0.85)
(0.77)
(0.70)
(0.94)
(0.93)
abshiunemp
1.794
1.794
1.794
1.794
9.826
9.826
9.826*
9.866**
(7.59)
(6.35)
(3.16)
(3.16)
(9.61)
(6.80)
(4.76)
(4.15)
abshiown
-4.127***
-4.127***
-4.127**
-4.127***
-2.443
-2.443
-2.443
-2.281
(1.53)
(1.45)
(1.35)
(1.35)
(2.05)
(2.42)
(2.54)
(2.31)
polpwr=1
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
polpwr=2
-0.052
-0.052
-0.052
-0.052
-0.110
-0.110
-0.110
-0.086
(0.31)
(0.17)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.32)
(0.15)
(0.10)
(0.10)
polpwr=3
-0.174
-0.174
-0.174
-0.174
-0.046
-0.046
-0.046
-0.053
(0.29)
(0.26)
(0.23)
(0.23)
(0.32)
(0.23)
(0.13)
(0.13)
polpwr=4
0.058
0.058
0.058
0.058
-0.018
-0.018
-0.018
-0.010
(0.27)
(0.21)
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.27)
(0.09)
(0.05)
(0.06)
cl=3
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
cl=4
-0.423**
-0.423*
-0.423*
-0.423**
-0.343
-0.343
-0.343
-0.370
(0.19)
(0.21)
(0.19)
(0.19)
(0.85)
(0.57)
(0.30)
(0.26)
cl=5
-0.162
-0.162
-0.162
-0.162
-0.766
-0.766
-0.766*
-0.799**
(0.30)
(0.24)
(0.28)
(0.28)
(0.96)
(0.71)
(0.37)
(0.34)
cl=6
-0.396
-0.396
-0.396**
-0.396**
-0.638
-0.638
-0.638**
-0.652***
(0.28)
(0.26)
(0.16)
(0.16)
(0.46)
(0.49)
(0.25)
(0.22)
loggdp
-0.086
-0.086
-0.086
-0.086
-0.198
-0.198*
-0.198***
-0.196***
(0.08)
(0.07)
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.19)
(0.12)
(0.04)
(0.04)
neighbor
0.021
0.021
0.021
0.021
-0.065
-0.065
-0.065
-0.054
(0.13)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.18)
(0.11)
(0.06)
(0.05)
size
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
_t
0.007
0.007
0. 007
0.007
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
_t=1
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
_t=10
0.843
0.843**
0.843***
0.845***
(0.54)
(0.37)
(0.12)
(0.11)
_t=11
0.925
0.925
0.925*
0.898**
(0.95)
(0.93)
(0.46)
(0.41)
_t=17
-0.305
-0.305
-0.305
-0.333
(1.11)
(1.00)
(0.39)
(0.35)
_t=20
0.944
0.944*
0.944***
0.939***
(0.57)
(0.50)
(0.12)
(0.11)
_t=21
0.144
0.144
0.144
0.117
(0.99)
(0.80)
(0.38)
(0.34)
_t=23
1.256**
1.256***
1.256***
1.267***
(0.54)
(0.29)
(0.27)
(0.27)
_t=24
1.264**
1.264***
1.264***
1.246***
(0.51)
(0.22)
(0.14)
(0.14)
_t=28
-0.515
-0.515
-0.515
-0.561
(1.26)
(0.84)
(0.59)
(0.53)
_t=31
0.308
0.308
0.308
0.306
(0.25)
(0.21)
(0.35)
(0.35)
_t=32
-0.106
-0.106
-0.106
-0.117
(0.29)
(0.21)
(0.22)
(0.22)
_t=35
0.828
0.828*
0.828***
0.797***
(0.62)
(0.41)
(0.23)
(0.21)
_t=39
0.003
0.003
0.003
-0.014
(0.84)
(0.45)
(0.21)
(0.18)
_t=40
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
_t=41
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(.)
(.)
(.)
(.)
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constant

0.542
0.542
0.542
0.542
1.225
1.225
1.225***
1.227***
(0.55)
(0.41)
(0.50)
(0.50)
(1.28)
(0.80)
(0.30)
(0.27)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------N
66
66
66
66
66
66
66
66
r2
0.3079
0.3079
0.3079
0.3079
0.5701
0.5701
0.5701
0.5696
sigma_u
0
0.1652
sigma_e
0.4783
0.4051
rho
0
0.1426
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 9: Relationship between Horizontal Inequality and Group Involvement with Controls
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Overall, these results again find mixed support for H3. While they provide evidence for
the notion that horizontal inequality might affect how conflicts develop and who becomes
involved, they also caution against sweeping generalizations about the relationship between
horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics. According to these results, the type of inequality
matters. Possible explanations and contributions to theoretical orientations are further discussed
in Chapter 5.
4.3 Sensitivity Analyses
Until this point, I have described the relationships illustrated in Tables 1 through 9,
examining the relationship between horizontal inequality and 1) conflict occurrence and 2) group
involvement. However, I also conducted sensitivity analyses to further elucidate the nature of
these relationships.
I am primarily interested in exploring the relationship between horizontal inequality and
conflict dynamics by determining whether these variables appear to be correlated. I am not
primarily interested in either comparing the relationships of horizontal and vertical inequality on
conflict, or in dispelling the importance of vertical inequality on conflict. However, I still reestimated linear probability models including the standard measure of vertical inequality, the
GINI coefficient, to be able to note whether there were any differences in effect on the likelihood
of conflict33. This is similar in practice to former studies (e.g., Ostby 2008; Cederman et al.
2013). Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix C display the models. Table 10 re-estimates the linear
probability model of Tables 3 and 4 (where country-level indicators are used to predict conflict
as the dependent variable) with the GINI variable included. Table 11 re-estimates linear

33

Correlation coefficients between the GINI coefficient and the horizontal inequality measures can be found in
Figure 10 of Appendix B.
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probability models that include group involvement as the dependent variable (clustering by ID
and country, and incorporating both specifications of time).
Regarding Table 10, the addition of the GINI coefficient renders every social and
economic horizontal inequality indicator statistically significant. The GINI coefficient itself is
also statistically significant. This suggests that the GINI coefficient was a negative confounder
for the horizontal inequality indicators, and that including it made more apparent the relationship
between horizontal inequality and conflict. It is also notable that, in Table 10, the effect size of
the GINI coefficient is considerably small compared to each of the horizontal inequality
indicators. This sensitivity analysis further supports the idea horizontal inequality might affect
the likelihood of conflict in a way that is particularly informative, and that the way in which it
does so depends upon how that inequality manifests within the society.
Table 11 depicts several linear probability models, specified with different clustered
standard errors and time specifications. Across these models, grouped inequality in terms of
educational attainment, unemployment, and home ownership remain substantively consistent
with the main analysis results, shifting in and out of significance depending upon the
specification. In this table, the GINI coefficient is statistically significant when time is linear and
becomes insignificant when time is dummied. In every model specification, its detected effect
size is smaller than those of the horizontal inequality indicators. This sensitivity analysis also
supports the idea that horizontal inequality is informative for understanding conflict dynamics. It
also suggests that further attention should be paid to understanding inequality, how it manifests
in a society, and how that relates to conflict dynamics.
The GINI coefficient’s detected effect size is similar across model specifications in both
Tables 10 and 11. The models show that, as the GINI coefficient approaches 100 (perfect
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inequality), the likelihood of conflict increases. This fits into the literature’s (albeit mixed)
findings regarding the relationship between inequality and conflict. Namely, it is that, as
inequality increases within a society, conflict becomes more likely.
Sensitivity analyses support the notion that inequality and the way in which it manifests
in a society is important for determining conflict and its dynamics. They suggest that continued
investigation into the potential complexities of these relationships can be useful for better
understanding conflicts and how they develop.
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CHAPTER V: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
5.1 Discussion of Results
The results indicate evidence that horizontal inequality is related to both conflict
occurrence and group involvement in conflict. They also indicate that different forms of
horizontal inequality could have differential effects. The complex relationships between
horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics demonstrated in these analyses provide several
implications for our theoretical understanding of horizontal inequality and violent conflict, if
they hold. These results also prompt opportunity for discussion on the steps researchers and
policymakers can take to improve our ability to study these relationships further and address both
inequality and conflict in the applied world.
My results suggest that there is reason to continue exploring new indicators, data sources,
and ways of understanding the relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics.
Still, there are drawbacks and benefits to the analyses conducted with these data, discussed
below, and results must be considered tentative. Results must also be taken as preliminary given
the limited amount of data available, which has led to a small sample size and increased the
likelihood of Type II error (while simultaneously providing considerable evidence for indicators
that did appear to have a relationship). Current explorations demonstrate that there could be an
effect, and it could be more complex than we understand.
5.1.1 Drawbacks and Directions for Future Research
One drawback of this type of analysis is that it relies on relatively scarce census data
from various countries. As noted in section 3.4, “Model Specifications,” these countries each
conduct censuses at different times, leading to some irregularity in intervals. For example, while
Bangladesh’s censuses span every ten years, Uganda’s span eleven. One way to make time
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intervals between observation years equal would have been to interpolate what inequality looks
like every ten years for countries without ten-year censuses, but this method would then suffer
similar drawbacks to other studies in which interpolation was used34. If this path were chosen, I
would not be able to describe the relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict as it has
been observed. I also would have to rely on assumptions about the nature of horizontal inequality
in missing years, which introduces bias, particularly given that not much is understood about
horizontal inequality trends over time in the sample.
However, by not interpolating, I have somewhat irregular time intervals. There is thus a
tradeoff here between bias and efficiency. In part because there are studies that take advantage of
interpolating methods, which favor efficiency in the bias-efficiency tradeoff if the imputations
are biased, I elected to supplement these studies by analyzing relationships as they have been
observed. It should be noted, as discussed in section 3.4, “Model Specifications,” that there does
not appear to be any systematic cause of the uneven time intervals that is relevant to the nature of
the relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict. That is, the fact that Bangladesh
conducts its censuses every ten years, and Uganda does every eleven, does not seem to be as a
result of the presence or kind of inequality or conflict. Therefore, it is worth considering the
impact of this irregularity. Still, I have also included time as a dummy variable to further test the
robustness of estimates and have a fuller understanding of the potential relationships between
horizontal inequality and the outcomes of interest.
Another drawback to consider is the possibility of simultaneity, as discussed in section
3.5, “Methodological Limitations.” Statistically, it is difficult with these data to disentangle

34

It should be noted that, when time is linear, the analysis is subject to automatic non-response weighting. Including
time as a dummy variable helps mitigate this, despite using additional degrees of freedom, and tests the robustness
of parameter estimates.
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whether inequality or conflict is the precursor to the other, especially because of the considerable
restriction present in this analysis of studying them in the same year. In this case, inequality
present in one year must theoretically lead to conflict in that same year, assuming causality. To
some degree, examining the relationship between horizontal inequality and the predicted
probability of conflict (see Figure 3) helps ease this restriction. This is because the predicted
probability assesses how likely conflict generally is over a period of time, easing the restriction
of inequality leading to conflict in one particular year and further elucidating potential
correlations. Likewise, as discussed in section 3.5, “Methodological Limitations,” there is
theoretical reason to believe that horizontal inequality is causative of conflict. However, this
drawback should still be noted. Estimations of the relationship hold the restriction. This is
despite the fact that it is reasonable to believe the potential effects of inequality could take time
to settle in.
The preliminary analyses presented here are intended to assess whether there appear to be
empirical regularities and correlations between the indicators calculated and the outcomes of
interest, not to establish causality. Future researchers might consider implementing lag variables
of conflict to ease the restriction of this analysis (though, they would have to somewhat
arbitrarily decide the time period it would take for inequality to “cause” conflict, be that five
years, three years, etc.). They might also consider operationalizing their conflict outcome as the
number of years within a given period of time (e.g., five years, three years, etc.) that have
experienced conflict. Future researchers might also continue to use continuous predicted
probabilities as their outcome of choice, or employ other methods to ease this restriction and
further the discourse. Statistically, it is difficult to establish causality in this relationship, and that
drawback is still present in the current study. Instead, it evidences that acquiring additional data,
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incorporating various indicators of horizontal inequality, and exploring the relationships between
horizontal inequality and additional aspects of violent conflict would be beneficial to the field.
Relatedly, the analyses presented in the current study are intended to assess whether the
presence of inequality between groups itself (i.e., the absolute value of a group’s distance from
the national average) is associated with a change in conflict occurrence and group involvement
(see section 3.2.2 for additional explanation of the rationale for using absolute values). However,
it is possible that this relationship is further affected by other aspects of the inequality, such as
whether the groups are better- or worse-off. On this front, I have conducted preliminary
supplementary analyses examining horizontal inequality’s relationship with conflict occurrence
and group involvement. In these analyses, I estimate some of the models using the true values of
horizontal inequality measures as opposed to their absolute values (see Tables 12 and 13 in
Appendix C).
Interpretation of these models’ coefficients is not as straightforward since values both
above and below 0 mean that a group is moving farther away from the national average. It should
be kept in mind that, when examining the supplementary analyses in Appendix C, the
coefficients indicate the estimated change in the dependent variable as the measure of dispersion
increases on the independent variable. For example, if an estimated coefficient is 5, then the
likelihood of the dependent variable increases as groups become more unequal (regardless of
whether they are trending above or below the national average). If a coefficient is -5, the
likelihood of the dependent variable decreases as groups become more unequal. Coefficients
themselves do not indicate differential effects between being better- or worse-off.
It is notable that, without taking the absolute value, grouped differences in literacy appear
to positively correlate with group involvement. Likewise, home ownership appears to positively
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(as opposed to negatively, as in the main analyses) correlate with the outcome variables. Taking
the absolute value of horizontal inequality measures facilitates interpreting meaningful results
and gets at the relationship between grouped inequality and conflict dynamics, but it truncates
data and makes distinguishing differential effects between better- and worse-off groups
infeasible. Examining how horizontal inequality relates to conflict and its dynamics with actual
values, and delving further into how additional factors about the inequality manifests, such as
whether a group is better- or worse-off, is a viable next step for researchers to take. Preliminary
analyses in Appendix C suggest that such explorations might be fruitful.
There are several other takeaways from this dissertation that can inform the direction of
future studies. This research project points to the idea that it is useful to include various
indicators of economic, social, and political horizontal inequality, as these various indicators
might have differential effects, even if they are all, for example, forms of economic inequality.
Former researchers (e.g., Stewart 2008; Ostby 2008; Cederman et al. 2013) have suggested that
there could be differential effects between social, economic, and political horizontal inequality;
however, this analysis suggests that, even within these categories, different manifestations of
horizontal inequality might have differential effects. It is important to pursue additional data and
indicators from various data sources, as this might elucidate the relationship between horizontal
inequality and conflict dynamics (see section 5.3 for a discussion of what additional data might
ideally look like).
Additional data and data sources could also help researchers test whether the effects of
certain inequalities are independent, or if they have given effects in the presence of other factors.
As noted in sections 2.2 and 3.2.3, current understandings suggest that inequality does not
operate in a vacuum. Discussions in Chapter 4 bolster this idea, indicating that some forms of
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inequality seem to have robust and independent estimated effects, while others seem to
strengthen in their effect as other variables are included in models. If researchers continue to
explore these relationships with additional data, they will be able to better understand to what
extent the effects of horizontal inequality are independent and to what extent the effects change
in the presence of other variables.
Pursuing additional data will help researchers better understand which horizontal
inequality indicators have a robust relationship with conflict dynamics, as well, and what the
magnitude of those effects are. It is unclear whether the effects discussed in Chapter 4 will hold
as sample size increases. Additional observation years would help elucidate this, as results would
likely coalesce as more observations are included.
Finally, it seems important that researchers examine the effect of horizontal inequality on
not only whether conflict initially occurs, but also the dynamics of that conflict. While there are
papers examining ethnic cleavages and the duration of a conflict (e.g., Wucherpfennig et al.
2012) or its intensity (Murshed and Gates 2005), there is a need for further research that expands
our understanding of how horizontal inequality affects other conflict dynamics. Results of this
analysis suggest that such research could help inform conclusions on conflicts and their
developments. These results, though preliminary, indicate that it is worth continuing down the
path of pursuing additional data and expanding the kinds of indicators included in cross-cultural
analyses of horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics.
Despite analytical limitations, I use this dissertation to build upon the going literature on
inequality and mass violent conflict. I expand dependent variables to include not just initial
conflict onset, but whether conflict happens in a given year and which groups become involved
in conflict. I also use census data to include more granular measurements of economic and social
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horizontal inequality than have been included in many previous cross-country analyses, and
examine their observed effects on conflict occurrence and group involvement. I note that these
could be informative if included as unique variables in an analysis, rather than as a composite
score, because of their potentially complex effects. Finally, I look to further paths for studying
horizontal inequality indicators and noting their possibly differential effects. Though results are
preliminary, they point to the usefulness of expanding data on and indicators of horizontal
inequality and its potential outcomes. They also provide several potential theoretical and
methodological implications, detailed below.
5.2 Implications for Theory
The results in Chapter 4 can help contribute to the discourse on conflict determinants.
Thus far, the going theories of conflict and inequality (discussed at length in Chapter 2) have
asserted that, as horizontal inequality increases, the likelihood of conflict increases (Murshed and
Gates 2005; Mancini 2008; Ostby 2008; Stewart et al. 2010; Cederman et al. 2013). Some of
these theorists (e.g., Stewart et al. 2008; Cederman et al. 2013) have posited that social and
political horizontal inequality have a larger effect on conflict than economic horizontal
inequality, since political and social inequalities often have de jure support and follow group
lines more explicitly than economic inequalities (see Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion). These
theories have dominated the area since its inception. However, the results presented in the
current study indicate that there could be a more complex relationship between horizontal
inequality and conflict than understood.
One notable takeaway from this study is that horizontal inequality might be positively or
inversely correlated with conflict dynamics depending upon the specific way in which a given
society is unequal. To summarize the key findings of Chapter 4, horizontal inequality might be
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associated with an increase in the probability of conflict if a society is unequal in terms of its
access to electricity. Horizontal inequality is also, however, associated with a decrease in the
probability of conflict, if the society is unequal in terms of its educational attainment and/or
home ownership rates. Likewise, groups seem more likely to become involved in conflict as they
become more unequal in their access to electricity and unemployment rates. They seem less
likely to engage in conflict as they become more unequal in their educational attainment and
home ownership rates. There are several possible explanations as to why this might be.
First, it could be that horizontal inequality increases the likelihood of civil conflict when
the society is unequal in a way that prevents the attainment of a minimum threshold for a good
quality of life. If someone faces a lack of access to electricity, for example, that would negatively
impact their quality of life more significantly than whether they owned the home they lived in.
Likewise, if someone were unemployed, they might be less able to afford basic goods and
services than if they did not have a complete schooling, or a university degree. Groups, therefore,
could be satisfied enough to eschew violence when they have attained benefits like access to
electricity and employment, even without home ownership or significant educational attainment.
This might help account for why certain grouped inequalities are positively correlated with
conflict and group involvement, while others are inversely correlated.
It could also be that horizontal inequality increases the likelihood of civil conflict, unless
one group is so much wealthier or more educated that a country experiences “brain drain,”
leaving behind such a small group that remaining inequality is largely imperceptible by the
population. It is important to keep in mind that, in this study, I did not distinguish between
whether a group was above or below national average – just how unequal they were. The results,
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therefore, estimate relationships between inequality in the most literal sense – how far a group is
from average – and conflict. This includes groups that are far above average, as well.
The findings could, therefore, be attributable to groups with very high educational
attainment and home ownership rates also being more likely to be considerably wealthy (as
opposed to groups with average employment rates or with access to basic electricity, which are
not as strongly dependent upon the attainment of considerable wealth). At the first sign of
instability, therefore, which might generally occur as a result of horizontal inequality, large
swaths of advantaged groups might flee the country, as they could afford to emigrate to more
stable countries35.The result would be a fairly small remaining group of well-off individuals,
which makes inequality less noticeable on the ground and could lessen people’s perceptions of
high inequality. This phenomenon would look like any standard “brain drain,” where very highly
educated populations from peripheral and semi-peripheral countries leave those countries,
actually decreasing its average educational attainment rate (Wong and Yip 1999). In this case
(and similar to brain drain), well-off, highly-educated groups could leave countries as they
destabilize, making conflict appear less likely as inequality increases, despite that the inequality
itself was destabilizing. This is consistent with the fact that having disparities in electricity is
associated with more conflict: having access to electricity would not necessarily be associated
with very wealthy groups (even if relatively well-off in the given society) who would be able to
flee at the first sign of instability.
It could also be that home ownership is a proxy for housing stability, and low housing
stability indicates that people are moving more often and are less able to mobilize effectively.

35

Examples of high-skilled, highly educated human capital fleeing as civil conflict ramps up can be seen in
countries such as Liberia, where widespread instability and war-related deaths exacerbated human capital flight
(Barclay 2002).
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Lee et al. (1994) found that homeowners are less likely to move than home renters. Perhaps
groups with very low home ownership rates are more mobile, and less able to organize with
other members of their group as one cohesive unit. This would lessen the potential for overall
conflict.
The above explanations might help us understand why horizontal inequality seems to
have different effects depending upon which factor(s) in a society is/are unequal. Still, these
explanations are speculative: it would be inaccurate to suggest that researchers understand
precisely why horizontal inequality might affect conflict in the way that it appears to. While
other scholars have found evidence that horizontal inequality’s effects differ depending upon
whether that inequality is social, economic, or political (e.g., Stewart 2002; Ostby 2008;
Cederman et al. 2013 – see Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion), few researchers have explored
whether effects of horizontal inequality differ at this level of granularity (e.g., access to
electricity versus home ownership). Because these results are novel in that different inequality
indicators seem to have different effects on conflict occurrence and group involvement, there is
not much theoretical understanding to identify why these differences might exist. Researchers
should look to corroborating these results and exploring possible theoretical explanations further
in future studies.
Perhaps the clearest theoretical implication of these results, if they hold, is that the type
of horizontal inequality present in a society can change how likely that society is to experience
conflict. To better understand, predict, and prevent conflict, it is important to ascertain which
inequalities might help cause conflict and why. The previous literature on inequality and conflict,
as well as this study, have demonstrated that it is not just inequality that causes conflict, but
rather, the type of inequality present that helps determine whether there is conflict. Horizontal
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inequality is more informative to conflict than vertical inequality, as discussed extensively in
Chapter 2 and again demonstrated in Chapter 4. In the same manner, the results of this study
indicate that it is not just any horizontal inequality that affects conflict and its dynamics. This
takeaway is pivotal as researchers think both theoretically and policy-wise about why violence
happens, which kinds of inequalities policymakers should focus on, and which policies decisionmakers should enact to preserve stability and peace. Recognizing the possibility of the complex
relationship demonstrated in this study is important to these discussions.
Notably, I did not find a clear distinction between horizontal inequalities’ effects in terms
of whether they were social, economic, or political. Some of the literature suggests that
economic horizontal inequality matters least (e.g., Stewart 2002; Ostby 2008; Cederman et al.
2013 – see Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion); though, I do not find statistical support for the role
of political horizontal inequality, which was insignificant. Political horizontal inequality also
typically had a smaller effect size on conflict than the economic or social horizontal inequality
indicators did. It is also notable that, of the economic and social horizontal inequality indicators
inversely associated with conflict occurrence and/or group involvement, one (educational
attainment) was an indicator of social horizontal inequality and one (home ownership rates) was
an indicator of economic horizontal inequality. Overall, these results suggest that it might not be
about an inequality being social, economic, or political per se, but rather something else about
the nature of the inequality (e.g., whether the inequality threatens a minimum quality of life,
whether the inequality allows for brain drain, etc.) determining whether conflict is more likely
and which groups become involved.
Examining these results can help us further understand the relationship between
horizontal inequality and conflict. According to these results, the specific type of inequality is
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important for determining both the likelihood of a conflict occurring as well as which groups are
likely to be involved in that conflict. However, it is also worth noting that researchers currently
understand very little about why these complexities might exist and how they affect violence.
5.3 Implications for Methodological Considerations
A perusal of the literature on horizontal inequality and conflict will make clear that the
field is still suffering from considerable methodological and data limitations. As discussed in
Chapter 2, data is severely lacking on horizontal inequality (Canelas and Gisselquist 2018), and
several authors have circumvented this issue by interpolating missing data (e.g., Ostby 2008;
EPDC 2015) or honing in on case studies (e.g., Stewart 2000). However, there are still many
research gaps in the field, and better data is necessary to more accurately depict the relationship
between horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics. Researchers would be well-served to
improve data collection methods where possible to allow for the continued study of horizontal
inequality and conflict. In the following section, I provide several suggestions to this end.
Improving data quality, specifically of horizontal inequality measures, is vital to the
continued and improved study of horizontal inequality and conflict. There are two main issues
surrounding data on horizontal inequality: its unavailability and its poor quality. Fixing these
problems is not straightforward: for this reason, many of them remain unaddressed. Still,
discussions on how to improve data collection and quality can help researchers consider possible
next steps to the improved study of horizontal inequality and conflict.
5.3.1 Addressing Data Unavailability
Regarding data collection, it would be preferable if data were more widely available on
horizontal inequality. Currently, the data that can be used to measure horizontal inequality is
limited to countries that make it publicly available. The extent of any bias resulting from this
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context is arguably small, given that the data used is typically not collected for the purpose of
examining horizontal inequality, and countries included in the sample are less likely to have
systematic differences in inequality than unexamined countries (see Ostby 2008 and Chapter 3’s
“The Sample” for a fuller discussion). However, the current data’s advantage of “random”
selection is also its downfall. Because data used to produce horizontal inequality measures was
not collected for this purpose, it tends to be “messy,” often needing to be reorganized and
recalculated to come up with adequate measures.
There are two possible remedies to this problem. The first is that a data-aggregating
entity, such as a research center with an interest in inequality, could ma intain a public horizontal
inequality database. Compilers of the database would aggregate existing data on each relevant
group’s standing in a given society and calculate horizontal inequality measures, ideally
operationalized in several possible ways (e.g., a group’s distance from the national average, a
group score, etc.). The database would then need to be regularly updated. This database would
allow researchers to readily conduct analyses with more standard measures. It would also remove
the need for researchers to constantly recalculate horizontal inequality indicators from censuses
that are already publicly available.
The second possible remedy is that researchers could begin collecting novel data for the
specific purpose of studying horizontal inequality. This would allow researchers to record
information on relevant groups’ income levels, access to healthcare, and other pertinent variables
that are not readily available for a host of countries. These data could also include measures of
perceived inequality. If made public, these data would be readily available and would include
more comprehensive measures of horizontal inequality than currently exist. They would
therefore broaden the scope of what researchers are able to study about horizontal inequality.
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Both of the above solutions have their own advantages and disadvantages. Regarding the
first (i.e., aggregating existing data and using it to calculate horizontal inequality measures in a
public database), optimizing existing data would maintain the advantage of low sample bias,
since countries are less likely to censor data that is not collected for any purpose related to
tracking inequality. However, the tradeoff is a considerably low sample size because horizontal
inequality measures are generally calculated from census data or the Demographic and Health
Surveys. However, the specific variables collected in the census or survey change depending
upon a given country’s interests. The result is a database with several variables available for a
few countries, but few variables available for most countries. This limits the generalizability of
any analysis employing these data.
Regarding the second solution (i.e., collecting new data for the purpose of studying
horizontal inequality), data collection efforts would result in more comprehensive inequality
measures and expand the research capabilities of the field. However, this solution could face
considerable censorship problems: countries are less likely to allow researchers to collect data
that would highlight the degree of inequality present in that country, particularly if the country
experiences inequality-related violence. This could increase the amount of sample bias in the
data, and subsequently inform biased analyses.
It is possible to combine these two solutions. Efforts to both optimize existing data and
collect better data would be ideal, pending feasibility. This would likely be most easily
undertaken if several research centers were to focus on advancing our understanding of
horizontal inequality, with each research center focusing on one solution. It is also possible to
compare analyses from newly-collected data with analyses from existing data (i.e., the analyses
that have been presented in the literature thus far). Doing this would allow researchers to
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compare differences between the analyses, if any, and readjust their focuses on collecting new
data or optimizing existing data, if they assess bias from either source to be too strong.
Addressing persistent data issues is not straightforward logistically or ethically. As
Canelas and Gisselquist (2018) have noted, in addition to the abovementioned logistical hurdles,
there remains the question of the ethics of data collection on horizontal inequality. It is worth
considering whether it is ethical to seek out data that, if made public, might be used to rally
people and cause instability. Likewise, there is also the question of whether it is ethical to keep
the same data hidden, so that people are less aware of their society’s inequalities and therefore
have less footing to challenge them. However, assuming that researchers decide to continue to
seek out data, the potential to do so relies on optimizing “messier” existing data with potentially
less bias, or attempting to collect cleaner and more comprehensive data where allowed and
risking increased bias. These steps would further the study of horizontal inequality.
Related to the ethics of acquiring data is the ethics of conducting analyses on horizontal
inequality and conflict, assuming data is available. Some researchers might have the ethical
concern that analyses of conflict determinants could be abused to further repress vulnerable
populations within societies if such analyses were misused by those in positions of political
power. For example, the literature’s common finding that not only the least repressive but also
the most repressive governments experience the fewest instances of violent rebellion could be
(mis)used to rationalize extreme forms of government repression. Likewise, discussions of which
forms of inequality are most likely to cause conflict and between whom could be manipulated to
allow for the most amount of “tolerable” inequality, or to profile and unfairly monitor groups of
people who are determined “more likely” to engage in conflict.
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These ethical considerations should be kept at the forefront of researchers’ minds as they
continue to pursue additional data and conduct more research on the relationship between
inequality and conflict. Researchers should be careful to note that there are a host of social ills
and ethical issues associated with inequality, government repression, and other factors separate
of their potential effect on conflict likelihood. These ills and issues alone are sufficient to pursue
the most equal and least repressive societies possible. Similarly, researchers should be careful to
state what can and cannot be drawn from their work, as well as the implications of their work.
Proactively discussing research and policy implications, and making clear the host of
repercussions related to inequality and repression that are persistent regardless of their
relationship with conflict, is an important step in reducing the risk of that research being abused
to rationalize the mistreatment of others.
5.3.2 Addressing Data Quality
Thus far, this section has focused on the issue of data availability; however, strong data
quality is also vital to informative studies on horizontal inequality and conflict. Data on
horizontal inequality should maintain certain qualities to ensure they are most useful to future
studies. As noted in Chapter 4, this study’s results indicate that horizontal inequality might affect
conflict and its dynamics differently, not just dependent upon whether it is social, economic, or
political, but even at a more granular level. It therefore might not be preferable to lump a host of
indicators together as one “social,” “economic,” or “political” inequality variable, but rather, to
separately include each indicator in a database in case there are differences in their effects.
Because of this, it is inadvisable for a given data-collecting entity to solely make available, for
example, a social horizontal inequality “score.” Researchers do not yet know enough about how
various types of horizontal inequality differ in terms of their effect on conflict. Until we
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understand this better, it is important to collect data at a fairly granular level, and conduct
analyses that use each indicator as a variable. This will help researchers better understand how
horizontal inequality is related to conflict, which will in turn sharpen theory and policymaking
practices.
Likewise, because researchers understand so little about the potential complexity of the
relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict, it is important to use existing data where
possible. Previous studies (e.g., Ostby 2008; EPDC 2015) have had to interpolate missing data
due to necessity: it would have been difficult to generate meaningful results with such small
sample sizes. However, as has been discussed at length in Chapter 2, results can vary greatly
depending upon factors such as interpolation, measurement, etc. (Chesher 1991; Kreutz 2010).
Thus, it is preferable to use original data where possible, especially given that data and
methodological capabilities are improving over time. It is important to remain cautious when
claiming what researchers know and do not know about the relationship between horizontal
inequality and conflict.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that efforts to improve data and methodological
choices should be focused on measures of horizontal inequality, which have thus far been
elusive. Available data on conflict and control variables commonly used in studies of horizontal
inequality and conflict (e.g., GDP, governmental repression, etc.) are fairly straightforward and
readily available. Likely as a result of this, these data have been collected in a clean, clear, and
consistent way by sources such as the World Bank (2020), UCDP (2019), ACLED (2010), and
Freedom House (2019), to name a few. Therefore, focusing on refining horizontal inequality
measures will allow for considerable improvement in the study of inequality and conflict.
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There are several steps researchers can take to make studies on horizontal inequality and
conflict more informative. To better understand the connection between horizontal inequality and
conflict, researchers should invest in data collection and aggregation and remain cautious about
the conclusions they draw from their research, particularly given methodological and data
constraints. This will be helpful in endeavors to better understand the relationship between
horizontal inequality and conflict.
5.4 Conclusions about Theoretical and Methodological Implications
The results of this study have implications for both the theoretical orientations and
methodological choices future researchers will take with regards to horizontal inequality and
conflict. These implications should be noted to guide future study of the topic.
Regarding theoretical understandings of horizontal inequality and conflict, the most
salient takeaway from this study is that horizontal inequality appears to be informative to both
the presence of conflict and who is involved in that conflict. This study is unique in that its
results indicate that how horizontal inequality affects conflict and its dynamics might depend
upon the type of horizontal inequality present in the society, even down to a fairly granular level.
The reason why certain inequalities seem to have the effects they do is still left to speculation,
and deserves attention from further research.
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CHAPTER VI: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Scholars have been questioning the origins of violent conflict for centuries (e.g., Hobbes
1651; Kant 1795). That investigation continues today (e.g., Cederman et al. 2013; Pettersson et
al. 2019). It is my hope that this study contributes to these discussions.
This contribution represents the next phase in a long tradition of research on violent
conflict. Recall that horizontal inequality is inequality between groups, as opposed to vertical, or
absolute, inequality within a society. The results of this study indicate that horizontal inequality
contributes to both the presence of violent civil conflict and which groups are involved in that
conflict. The direction of effects – that is, whether conflict and group involvement are more or
less likely – seem to depend upon the specific ways in which a given society is unequal. There
are a host of policy implications and conclusions that can be drawn from these findings,
assuming that these relationships hold in future studies.
6.1 Policy Implications
One of the most salient takeaways for policymakers is that, when determining risk for
conflict, particularly in moderately repressive regimes, they should consider the state of
inequality in a given country. The results of this study indicate that inequality might inform
whether a country is likely to experience conflict. It also might be relevant for assessing which
groups are most likely to become involved in the conflict. Therefore, if these findings hold,
policymakers seeking evidence-based solutions for violent conflict should monitor and attempt
to ameliorate the most pernicious kinds of inequality, enumerated below. These steps provide the
most promising paths forward for understanding and preventing violent civil conflict.
First, it is important that policymakers assess the state of inequality between groups.
There is consistent documentation throughout the literature that inequality between groups
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within a society, or relative inequality, is pertinent to conflict (Stewart 2000; Ostby 2008;
Mancini 2008; Cederman et al. 2013). This dissertation is no exception. I find that horizontal
inequality has a considerably larger effect size on the likelihood of conflict than vertical
inequality. Policymakers interested in preventing violent conflict, then, might specifically focus
on monitoring inequality between groups if they hope to have the largest effect in reducing a
country’s likelihood of conflict.
Results of this study also indicate that it might not just be grouped inequalities, but
specific kinds of grouped inequalities, that increase the risk of conflict and involvement in that
conflict more than others. Different indicators of horizontal inequality had differential effects.
Policymakers might therefore prioritize amelioration of these inequalities if they hope to
decrease the likelihood of these outcomes.
The literature on horizontal inequality and conflict is still fairly young, and scholars are
still exploring which inequalities encourage conflict the most and why. It is possible that there
are underlying reasons why some indicators of horizontal inequality seem potentially more
informative than others. Further exploration of these reasons will help tease out more specific
policy implications. For example, if it is true that the most dangerous inequalities are grouped
inequalities in which one group is not able to attain a threshold for a minimum quality of life,
then we can extrapolate that the policy focus should be on such inequalities (of which access to
electricity, for instance, would be an example). However, before this can be stated with any
confidence, future studies should delve further into examining whether specific kinds of grouped
inequalities make a society particularly at-risk, as discussed in Chapter 5 (“Research
Implications”). Until then, policymakers should be aware that some grouped inequalities might
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be more relevant than others, and that reducing grouped inequality generally is likely to pay
dividends in terms of preventing instability.
Any inequality within a society is cause for concern: its presence can negatively affect
quality of life at the individual and societal level (Braithwaite 2013; Neves et al. 2016).
However, in this study, I provide evidence that some forms of inequality might have an
especially pernicious effect, in that their presence might be more strongly correlated with violent
conflict occurrence and group involvement. This difference, specifically at the level of
granularity indicated in this study, has not been observed in previous studies. Policymakers
should continue to consult researchers as theories on the most pertinent inequalities to violent
conflict continue to emerge. Following these guidelines can help ensure that their societies are
safe and stable.
6.2 Conclusions
Until the early 2000s, several authors (e.g., Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier and
Hoeffler 2004) believed the relationship between inequality and conflict was uncommon or
inconsistent at best, and non-existent at worst. This discussion changed, however, with the work
of Stewart (2000) and subsequent scholars (e.g., Ostby 2008; Cederman et al. 2013). They found
relative (i.e., horizontal) inequality between groups was much more informative to the advent of
conflict than absolute (i.e., vertical) inequality within a society. This distinction was important,
and studies of horizontal inequality have since demonstrated a positive relationship between it
and the likelihood of conflict (e.g., Mancini 2008; Ostby 2008; Tiwari 2010; Cederman et al.
2013).
Despite these advances, we still do not fully understand all of the complexities of the
relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict dynamics. There has been a lack of
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comprehensive data to adequately study this relationship, leading to chronically missing data and
findings that might not be generalizable. Likewise, the literature’s youth means that there are few
studies exploring the effect of horizontal inequality on aspects of a conflict other than simply
whether it occurred, such as who is involved, its intensity (but see Murshed and Gates 2005 for
an example), etc. Finally, though some scholars (e.g., Stewart 2008; Cederman et al. 2013) have
begun studying the issue, there is not much work exploring if and how different kinds of
horizontal inequality (i.e., social, political, economic, or, as this study indicates, even more
granular distinctions) affect conflict. The existence of these gaps means that scholars still have
more to explore regarding the relationship between horizontal inequality and violent conflict.
I have attempted to rectify some of the aforementioned limitations with the current study.
Employing census data spanning from 1971-2011 and across 8 countries, I have examined the
relationship between horizontal inequality and violent conflict occurrence, as well as horizontal
inequality and group involvement in conflict. Ultimately, I find evidence that there could be an
effect of horizontal inequality on these outcomes, and that it is perhaps more complex than we
have yet uncovered. The need for improved data, further research, and additional theory
development to explain these results and help prevent future conflicts is paramount.
To conduct this study and build my theories of conflict, I have drawn from the
criminology, political science, and public policy literatures. However, it is important to note that
these literatures have largely been constructed independently: scholars from these fields often
work with other scholars of their own respective disciplines. This is true despite each field’s
overlap with the others regarding inequality and conflict.
Many criminologists explore the relationship between inequality and crime (e.g., Hagan
1995; Lederman et al. 2002; Braithwaite 2013), and some are interested in determinants of large-
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scale and/or political violence (e.g., Savelsburg 2010; Altier et al. 2014; LaFree and Feilich
2016). Findings from this study, and from political science as a whole, are edifying to such
inquiries. I, as well as several political scientists (e.g., Ostby 2008; Cederman et al. 2013), find
evidence that grouped inequality is important for determining the likelihood of violent civil
conflict in which both sides are armed. Other criminologists, however, such as Hagan and
Rymond-Richmond (2008), have found grouped inequality also to be important in case studies of
international atrocity crimes. Studies of micro-level crime have also indicated that inequality
between racial and ethnic groups could be causative of violence (e.g., Peterson & Krivo 2005;
Stolzenberg et al. 2006; Hipp 2007). Stolzenberg et al. (2006) find interracial (i.e., grouped)
inequality to be more relevant to violent crime than absolute inequality, mirroring findings in the
horizontal inequality literature in political science.
Findings from the political science literature are generally supportive of the findings in
the broader inequality and crime literature. However, there has not been much formal distinction
in the criminological literature between vertical and horizontal inequalities and their different
effects (Stolzenberg et al. [2006] provide an exception to this trend). The approaches scholars
use in the political science and criminology literatures are complementary, as both suggest that
relative deprivation is an important factor in driving violence. The scholars’ interests are also
well-aligned, as both camps of researchers study the determinants of violence (though, often at
the micro-level, in the case of criminologists, and at the macro-level, in the case of political
scientists). The combined approaches and findings of political scientists and criminologists
indicate that continued efforts to reduce inequality, specifically between relevant cultural groups,
could be helpful for ameliorating a host of violent crimes, not just civil conflict. Notably, if my
findings apply to violence outside of civil conflict, as well, they would suggest that absolute
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inequality in a society might have a smaller effect on violent crime than relative inequality
between groups. They would also suggest that highlighting non-economic inequalities, such as
social and political inequalities, could be important for the study of how inequality promotes
violence. This is important, because it could help criminologists better understand the nature of a
potential inequality-crime nexus, as has been done in the political science literature. My findings
also provide evidence that these implications are not just relevant to criminologists studying
crime in the US, but in other countries, as well.
Just as in criminology, many political scientists have a demonstrated interest in the role
of inequality in producing mass violence (e.g., Collier and Sambanis 2002; Fearon and Laitin
2003; Stewart 2008; Cederman et al. 2013), to which criminological works can contribute.
Political scientists could apply criminological and psychological research on collective framing
and neutralization tactics (e.g., Sykes and Matza 1957; Oberschall 1995; Hagan and RymondRichmond 2008) to their works to possibly help explain how and why horizontal inequality
causes several kinds of political violence (e.g., electoral violence, civil war, terrorism) when it
does. This sort of application would go further than simply documenting the relationship
between inequality and political violence, and instead help to produce more grounded theories as
to why relationships between certain types of inequalities and violence exist, and how societies
transition from being unequal to being unstable when they do (ex., through collective framing
techniques). Criminological works can also inform the effect of perceived inequalities and group
differences on political violence perpetrated against other groups, since these perceptions have
been extensively studied in several criminological and psychological works (e.g., Gamson 1995;
Holmes 2000; Wang 2012). As discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.3.1 (“Collective Framing”),
these works suggest that inequality alone is insufficient for violence. Instead, groups must
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collectively frame inequality – real or perceived – as unjust, and they must frame another entity
(e.g., another ethnic group, the government, etc.) as responsible for that inequality. They also
often frame violence as self-defensive in nature, or as the only option left. These conditions
facilitate the transition of inequality into violence. The works on collective framing help explain
when and why inequality transitions into violence. Much of the framing literature is situated in
criminology, sociology, and psychology. These literatures can help develop theory in the
political science literature. This could in turn augment conclusions drawn in the political science
literature, where many of the discussions on mass violent conflict take place.
As well, academics in public policy have a vested interest in the use of the abovementioned literatures to prevent and mitigate violent conflict. Public policy scholars often test
and evaluate potential solutions to intractable social problems, including mass violence and
conflict (e.g., Clayton et al. 2001; Hillman 2013). These studies can benefit conflict scholars in
other fields, since program evaluations can help inform both the theory and practice of conflict
prevention and conflict resolution. The program and policy evaluation literature is vast, and this
approach can be helpful for determining the efficacy of potential solutions to conflict.
Researchers from political science have produced works that imply potential solutions that have
not yet been implemented or evaluated, but would benefit from the perspective of those in public
policy. Likewise, criminologists and political scientists often study the etiology of violence, and
this substantive expertise can be helpful to policy scholars specializing in evaluative
mechanisms. Combining these approaches through collaboration could therefore advance both
the study and practice of inequality and violence prevention.
Despite their overlapping interests, investigators from the above areas of study have
largely conducted research on inequality and violence independently. Criminologists have
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largely neglected the study of larger-scale political violence, as has been noted by several
sociologists and criminologists (e.g., LaFree and Dugan 2004; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond
2008; Moon 2011). This is unfortunate, given that each of the above areas of study have
subfields that have made considerable contributions to the discourse on inequality and violence.
Combining them and working collaboratively could help expand perspectives on inequality and
violence. It could usher in better understandings of which kinds of inequalities affect which
kinds of crimes. This, in turn, could produce practical solutions to the reduction of violence
globally.
Preventing and mitigating conflict requires continued collaboration between not only
academics from various disciplines, but also between academics and policymakers. The value of
peace and conflict studies lies in the field’s potential to improve the human condition. The study
of conflict resolution, therefore, requires an applied outlet, which policymakers are positioned to
provide. Knowledge of what causes instability and what is likely to rectify it is relevant insofar
as it is translated into a means to prevent and resolve such instability. Despite this, Mack (2002)
notes that disconnects between researchers and policymakers permeate the field, leading to
theory that does not affect practice and practice that is uninformed by theory. The very reason for
the field’s existence – to ameliorate existing social problems – cannot come to fruition in the
absence of continued coordination between researchers and policymakers. It is important for
scholars of peace and conflict studies to engage in collaboration with policymakers, making their
works available and consumable to non-academic audiences, especially decision-makers, with
this goal in mind. Researchers’ findings on horizontal inequality and violent conflict provide
bases from which social scientists can collaborate with policymakers to inform prevention and
intervention efforts.
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As mentioned above, criminology has shied away from the study of macro-level political
violence. However, as Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) argue, mass violence and
international atrocity crimes are of clear relevance to criminology, a field made up of scholars
with self-professed interests in understanding and preventing violence and victimization. Though
large-scale violence falls well within this scope, criminologists have largely focused on microlevel violence. If more criminologists dedicated themselves and their resources to the study of
such violence, they would be able to play considerable roles in helping prevent it. However, to
have the tools and capabilities to study these kinds of violence and human rights abuses 36 and to
simultaneously fail to do so is, therefore, a discipline-wide missed opportunity. For this,
criminology “bears a disciplinary responsibility for neglect,” to quote Schoenfeld et al. (2008) in
their reflections on criminology’s failure to help address conflict and atrocity crimes, aptly-titled
“While Criminology Slept.”
The study of horizontal inequality and violence provides an opportunity for researchers
from criminology, political science, and policy studies to collaborate. Criminologists have
conducted a host of works on micro-level violence and inequality (e.g., Hagan 1995; Peterson &
Krivo 2005; Stolzenberg et al. 2006; Hipp 2007), and their work applying collective framing
concepts to violence (e.g., Gamson 2005; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008) helps further
understandings of how and when inequality transitions into violence. Political scientists conduct
most of the studies on inequality and mass violent conflict (e.g., Stewart 2000; Fearon and Laitin
2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Ostby 2008; Cederman et al. 2013). Their work on horizontal
and vertical inequality provides a useful framework for predicting and theorizing about micro-
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Some, such as Schoenfeld et al. (2008), would even argue that criminologists have more expertise with which to
study the advent of atrocity crimes and conflict than many other fields involved in their study, such as public health
and international law. This context makes it especially concerning that criminologists have not yet pursued these
topics in large numbers.
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and macro-level violence. Finally, public policy scholars are well-equipped with evaluative
techniques and a policy-oriented focus that can help bridge the gap between theory and practice.
This specialization is helpful for the field, which is directly relevant to policy and violence
prevention. Interdisciplinary collaborations between these areas of study can help enhance
scholarly inquiry into violence and conflict and further efforts to prevent and mitigate violence
and inequality.
Mass violent conflict is a particularly harmful social problem. It causes refugee crises,
disease outbreaks, and human trafficking, to name a few (Gayer et al. 2007; Akee et al. 2010;
Hayes et al. 2016). The literature is increasingly demonstrating that inequality, particularly
between groups, could play a considerable role in determining whether a society will experience
violent conflict (Stewart 2008; Ostby 2008; Tiwari 2010; Cederman et al. 2013). In this
dissertation, I find support for that idea. I also find that different types of horizontal inequalities –
not just horizontal inequality itself – might have different effects on conflict, and that these
inequalities also inform conflict dynamics, such as which groups will engage in conflict.
Scholarly discoveries on horizontal inequality and conflict are still developing.
Academics still have progress to make on explaining, predicting, and preventing violent conflict.
With continued cooperation between disciplines and with policymakers, researchers can help
inform theory and practice on conflict resolution. This pursuit can help produce safer, more
stable societies.
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APPENDIX A - SAMPLE
Below is the full sample included in the dataset in alphabetical and numerical order.
Country Name

Year

Bangladesh

1991

Bangladesh

2001

Bangladesh

2011

Colombia

1993

Colombia

2005

Guatemala

1981

Guatemala

1994

Guatemala

2002

Indonesia

1971

Indonesia

1980

Indonesia

1990

Indonesia

2010

Mali

1987

Relevant Groups
Buddhists
Muslims
Hindus
Buddhists
Muslims
Hindus
Buddhists
Muslims
Hindus
Blacks/Indigenous
Whites
Blacks/Indigenous
Whites
Indigenous
Non-indigenous
Indigenous
Non-indigenous
Indigenous
Non-indigenous
Buddhists
Christians
Muslims
Buddhists
Christians
Muslims
Buddhists
Christians
Muslims
Buddhists
Christians
Muslims
Arabs/Moors
Blacks
Tuaregs
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Mali

1998

Mali

2009

Nepal

2001

Nepal

2011

Peru

1993

Peru

2007

Uganda

1991

Uganda

2002

Arabs/Moors
Blacks
Tuaregs
Arabs/Moors
Blacks
Tuaregs
Adibasi Janjati
Caste Hill Hindu Elites
Dalits
Madhesi
Muslims
Newars
Adibasi Janjati
Caste Hill Hindu Elites
Dalits
Madhesi
Muslims
Newars
Indigenous
Non-indigenous
Indigenous
Non-indigenous
Baganda
Banyarwanda
Basoga
Far North-west Nile
Langi-Achola
Southwesterners
Teso
Baganda
Banyarwanda
Basoga
Far North-west Nile
Langi-Achola
Southwesterners
Teso
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APPENDIX B – SUPPLEMENTARY STATISTICS

Figure 9: Correlation Coefficients for Independent and Control Variables

Figure 10: Correlation Coefficients for Key Independent Variables

Figure 11: Correlation Coefficients for Vertical and Horizontal Inequality Measures
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APPENDIX C – SENSITIVITY & SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES

-----------------------------------GINI
conflict
-----------------------------------m_abscm
5.235*
(2.52)
m_abslit
-5.985*
(2.94)
m_absuni
-31.503***
(8.36)
m_abselec
4.492***
(1.25)
m_absunemp
-29.425*
(13.74)
m_absown
-10.051***
(2.60)
gini
0.046***
(0.01)
constant
-0.496
(0.52)
-----------------------------------N
20
r2
0.736
-----------------------------------------* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 10: Relationship between Country-Level Indicators and Conflict with GINI
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------LPM+GINI
LPM + GINI
LPM + GINI
LPM + GINI
groupinv
cluster(ID)
cluster(ctry) cluster(ID), i._t cluster(ctry), i._t
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------abshicm
1.519
1.519
1.158
1.158
(1.71)
(1.76)
(1.48)
(1.05)
abshilit
1.353
1.353
-0.441
-0.441
(1.32)
(1.22)
(1.71)
(1.66)
abshiuni
-10.383
-10.383*
3.143
3.143
(8.08)
(4.63)
(6.35)
(4.45)
abshielec
1.052
1.052
-0.268
-0.268
(0.67)
(0.79)
(0.68)
(0.84)
abshiunemp
1.167
1.167
10.349
10.349**
(7.08)
(3.83)
(6.80)
(3.89)
abshiown
-4.650***
-4.650***
-2.114
-2.114
(1.31)
(1.14)
(2.38)
(2.45)
polpwr=2
-0.270
-0.270**
-0.165
-0.165
(0.20)
(0.11)
(0.15)
(0.14)
polpwr=3
-0.219
-0.219
-0.064
-0.064
(0.19)
(0.17)
(0.23)
(0.17)
polpwr=4
-0.056
-0.056
-0.061
-0.061
(0.14)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
cl=4
-0.348*
-0.348*
-0.529
-1.079***
(0.20)
(0.15)
(0.39)
(0.27)
cl=5
0.043
0.043
-0.734
-1.601***
(0.24)
(0.16)
(0.52)
(0.44)
cl=6
-0.344
-0.344**
-1.291**
-0.994***
(0.26)
(0.12)
(0.62)
(0.23)
loggdp
-0.043
-0.043
-0.247***
-0.407***
(0.08)
(0.05)
(0.09)
(0.08)
neighbor
0.051
0.051
0.110
-0.157**
(0.13)
(0.11)
(0.27)
(0.06)
size
0.004
0.004
0.003
0.003
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
_t
0.008
0.008
(0.01)
(0.01)
gini
0.026***
0.026***
0.045
0.000
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.03)
(.)
_t=1
0.000
0.000
(.)
(.)
_t=10
1.078**
1.320***
(0.41)
(0.22)
_t=11
0.599
0.544
(0.87)
(0.49)
_t=17
-0.061
-0.850
(0.77)
(0.46)
_t=20
1.063**
1.584***
(0.41)
(0.26)
_t=21
0.118
-0.319
(0.62)
(0.42)
_t=23
0.662
1.627***
(0.73)
(0.31)
_t=24
0.351
1.436***
(0.90)
(0.17)
_t=28
-1.450
-1.383*
(0.90)
(0.59)
_t=31
0.008
0.388***
(0.33)
(0.09)
_t=32
-0.719
-0.076
(0.57)
(0.10)
_t=35
0.079
0.523*
(0.68)
(0.23)
_t=39
0.000
-0.640**
(.)
(0.23)
_t=40
0.000
0.000
(.)
(.)
_t=41
0.000
0.000
(.)
(.)
constant
-0.608
-0.608**
-0.277
2.478***
(0.47)
(0.23)
(1.60)
(0.47)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------N
63
63
63
63
r2
0.3988
0.3988
0.6000
0.6000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 11: Group Involvement Full Models with GINI
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-----------------------------------------------------conflict
|
LPM
Logit
---------------------------------------------------m_hicm

2.138
56.803
(3.27)
(78.97)
m_hilit
0.607
12.668
(3.05)
(37.75)
m_hiuni
-23.988***
-350.004
(8.05)
(225.31)
m_hielec
1.652
-0.447
(1.59)
(20.34)
m_hiunemp
-20.065
-214.074
(18.51)
(177.81)
m_hiown
5.102*
38.820
(2.88)
(48.09)
constant
0.714***
0.982
(0.13)
(1.12)
---------------------------------------------------N
21
21
r2
0.472
---------------------------------------------------* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 12: Relationship between Country-Level Indicators and Conflict without Absolute Values
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------groupinv
LPM
LPM + ctrls
Logit
Logit + ctrls
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------hicm

-0.408
(1.05)
2.158**
(0.89)
-10.771***
(3.93)
-0.319
(0.60)
-0.991
(6.21)
2.214*
(1.13)

-0.031
-1.283
0.864
(1.51)
(5.31)
(8.53)
hilit
2.336**
14.057**
13.120*
(1.00)
(6.07)
(6.87)
hiuni
-2.777
-63.427**
-18.008
(6.77)
(27.47)
(41.33)
hielec
-0.260
-1.475
-0.314
(0.66)
(3.90)
(4.38)
hiunemp
-3.310
-4.957
-28.673
(6.89)
(41.51)
(54.51)
hiown
2.471*
18.900**
17.858
(1.37)
(9.61)
(11.86)
polpwr=1
0.000
0.000
(.)
(.)
polpwr=2
-0.232
-1.290
(0.30)
(1.62)
polpwr=3
-0.270
-1.474
(0.30)
(1.53)
polpwr=4
0.058
0.334
(0.32)
(1.69)
cl=3
0.000
0.000
(.)
(.)
cl=4
-0.494**
-2.646**
(0.22)
(1.26)
cl=5
-0.092
-0.232
(0.28)
(1.58)
cl=6
-0.419
-1.833
(0.28)
(1.49)
loggdp
-0.169*
-0.963*
(0.09)
(0.52)
neighbor
-0.122
-0.729
(0.12)
(0.67)
size
0.004
0.024
(0.00)
(0.02)
_t
0.012
0.075
(0.01)
(0.08)
constant
0.443***
0.983*
-0.241
2.275
(0.06)
(0.53)
(0.29)
(2.73)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------N
70
66
70
66
r2
0.2126
0.3017
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 13: Group Involvement Models without Absolute Values
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